Misinterest by Bowker, M.H.

Advance Praise for Misinterest
M.H. Bowker’s rich, refreshing, and sometimes startlingly per-
sonal work is an intellectual-spiritual foray into the void at the 
center of our missing experience of being actually interested 
in our lives. It reminds us how often we seek and accept false 
substitutes for deep thinking and for truly coming alive. But it 
also guides us in coping with tedious academic pretense, with 
groupthink, with the artifices we layer over conflictual desires. 
Through his elegant, graceful, amusing, genuine, and welcom-
ing writing, Bowker opens us to encounters with surprise, nov-
elty, and provocation without cynicism. His singularity of voice 
and rarity of perception are reminiscent of the simultaneously 
trance-inducing and startling first-time effects of Winnicott, 
Bion, and Phillips. You will emerge from Misinterest awakened 
and with renewed focus and intentionality, as if from the best 
kind of guided meditation.
— Jill Gentile, author of Feminine Law: Freud, Free Speech, 
and the Voice of Desire
Psychoanalysis is a psychology of absences, a mode of thinking 
about the significance of what’s missing. M.H. Bowker makes 
use of this psychoanalytic heuristic in his wonderfully provoca-
tive Misinterest. The book combines poetic, expository, and aph-
oristic forms, inviting readers into his stream-of-consciousness 
meditation on modern states of ennui. The essay “Is Sex Inter-
esting?” is alone worth the read.
— Janice Haaken, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, 
Portland State University
Misinterest is a meditation on how we choose (Do we choose?) 
to pay attention; that is, to engage, or not to. Written with a Zen-
like quality, I sometimes found myself wondering just what kind 
of volume was I reading — perhaps another mode of misinter-
est. Dr. Bowker’s volume reads as part poem, part koan, part 
psychoanalytic free association. An indeterminate journey half-
way between a documentary and a dream-book, I found Misin-
terest impossible to ignore.
— Dan Livney, Clinical Psychologist
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Before you start to read this book, take this 
moment to think about making a donation to 
punctum books, an independent non-profit press,
@ https://punctumbooks.com/support/
If you’re reading the e-book, you can click on the 
image below to go directly to our donations site. 
Any amount, no matter the size, is appreciated and 
will help us to keep our ship of fools afloat. Contri-
butions from dedicated readers will also help us to 
keep our commons open and to cultivate new work 
that can’t find a welcoming port elsewhere. Our ad-
venture is not possible without your support.
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I am deeply indebted to Eileen Joy for years of interest, inspira-
tion, generosity, and support. This project, like so many others, 
would have been impossible — perhaps inconceivable — with-
out her. I am obliged to Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei for his im-
mensely thoughtful editorial work and beautiful cover design.
I am grateful to David Levine, Fred Alford, Christian Hite, 
and Eduardo Frajman for their thoughtful comments on an 
early version of the essay, “Is Sex Interesting?” I have sought to 
address each of their concerns — some of which were, frankly, 
quite tough — in my revisions, but have not done so in ways in 
that would ultimately appease these generous friends and col-
leagues, who should not be considered to have endorsed the 
final product. 
A portion of the essay “How to be a Victim: Camus’s Plagues 
and Poisons” has been modified from a portion of Ideologies of 
Experience: Trauma, Failure, Deprivation, and the Abandonment 
of the Self (Chapter 6) published by Routledge in 2016.   
A version of the essay “Civilizing Ironies” was published un-
der a different title in Clio’s Psyche 21, no. 3 (2014): 264–68. 








A forgotten dream has an exquisite (ex + quaerere: sought out) 
quality.   
That it is missed, and known to be missed — which is to say 
that we remember we’ve forgotten it — gives it a precious feel-
ing, the timbre of a cloud. 
The dream, itself, may be profound or banal: a revelation of 
a sacred truth or a nightmare about forgetting to wear shoes.   
Someone will say a forgotten dream must be forgotten, is 
meant to be missed, as if we could know what is not meant to 
be known.
When we forget a dream, we miss a chance to hear a frag-
ment of our wish and fear. In this sense, we miss a chance to be 
completely. 
It is fair to ask, “Who can blame us for forgetting?”
It is fair to ask, “What if there were no dream?”
It is fair to ask, “What if the dream were not forgotten but 
imagined in order to be imagined to be forgotten?”
It is fair to dream about an ancient being who shared one’s 
dream but did not forget.
The missing content of the forgotten dream may be the ex-
quisite, itself, in its purest form: the unredeemable. 
Still, it is unjust to consecrate such missing as meant to be. 
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To make missing meant to be is to say we’re meant to miss 
being. 
2.
When we call for an answer but hear no reply, we are tempted to 
mistake silence for missing and missing for mystery.  
Investigations into mysteries are ill-fated because mysteries 
are made of things we determine to be meant to be missed. 
Indeed, mysteries require silences, mute and magnify them, 
insisting that inconceivable words, prayers, or songs may be 
heard, but only if they are never articulated. 
We make mysteries on behalf of our misinterest: a neologism 
(I know) needed to describe antipathy to interest.
Misinterest is, admittedly, a paradoxical concept, for we are 
not supposed to be averse to that which interests us, much less 
to interest, itself. 
And yet misinterest is everywhere, compelling us to mistake, 
mishear, misunderstand. 
Misinterest protects us from the grief of re(-)called misses, 
but does so at the cost of interest in life. 
Why? 
Because of the feeling: “not good enough.”
If we are not good enough, we are not good enough to be. 
Interest is a way of being; indeed, the heart of it. 
Thus, guilt attends interest if we believe — even unconscious-
ly — that we’re unworthy of interest, missing what is needed, 
undeserving of being.  
Efforts not to be occasion guilt as well, since most of us know 
— even unconsciously — that we need to be. 
3.
If a parent were, for any reason, incapable of loving a child, that 
parent would do well enough to show the child interest.
For love is only interest of a very special sort. 
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Someone will object that love is infinitely more, that interest 
alone is not enough. 
This objection, too, is made of misinterest, misused to serve 
love’s mystery. 
Very often one person loves another, even profoundly, even 
ferociously, but cannot hold love’s central interest. Hence, love 
goes missing and becomes a mystery. 
The making of missing love into a mystery is a tragedy with 
which any thoughtful person is familiar: familiar, in part, be-
cause it is, principally, familial. 
4.
To the dilemma implied by this condition, a solution presents 
itself: to survive. 
To survive is to be barely, to transpose the feeling, “not 
good enough to be,” into the conviction, “To be barely is good 
enough.”
Those who would be barely require deprivations, environs 
that recapitulate abandonments in which another was not good 
enough, but wherein thinking so would have been tantamount 
to death. 
In such cases, to be “not good enough” is a means of surviv-
ing. 
One cannot be barely amidst plenty. But the deprivations and 
abandonments referred to here are not concrete. 
Instead, visible, tangible, audible surpluses of all sorts may 
surround the barely being beings who, nonetheless, have “not 
enough” at their centers.
5.
It is fair to ask whether we occupy ourselves with such investiga-
tions (recherches, Forschungen) to discover what we miss or to 
avoid it, whether we pursue “la magique étude du Bonheur” [“the 
magical study of happiness”] of which Rimbaud wrote wryly be-
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cause it is a study “que nul n’élude” [“that no one escapes”] (1886), 
or in spite of its putative inevitability. 
It is uncertain whether we may ask why we miss what is miss-
ing without indulging in a fascination with loss, whether we can 
truly perpendiculate the peripheries to which we are drawn, 
whether we can hold on to what is central, even as centrifugal 
forces seem to pitch us away. 
Some find it distressing to discover that there is no such thing 
as “centrifugal force.” Even what we feel to be “centrifugal” is a 
fiction born of an inertial frame, a frame we keep forgetting, like 
a dream, as we move and move, all the time missing what makes 
physical forces real: objects acting upon objects. 
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A Dream of Fundamentalist Resorts
 
I’ve made a terrible mistake and have driven my family to one 
of New York State’s many Fundamentalist Resorts: resorts where 
Fundamentalists go to relax. 
Needless to say, only Fundamentalists are permitted to enter. 
The resorts are embassies of extremism, sovereign territories of 
Leisure and Law.  
Those who attend them are more Fundamental than any creed. 
There is no question of doctrine. There are no Christians or 
Muslims or Jews: only Fundamentalists whose Fundamentalism 
surpasses all others’. 
The Fundamentalists speak a language foreign to me, even 
though I speak all languages.  
As we exit the car, four tremendous guards hurl themselves on 
me. My wife and daughter are torn from my side. 
I am examined, inspected, interrogated. 
The guards search my bags for items that would prove my piety, 
asking — now in English —about my toiletries.
22
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Indeed, they are obsessed with my toiletries’ insufficiency.  
“These toiletries are for you!” they shout, between scoffs and 
curses.  
I feel a pang of shame as I look at the items they’ve laid out on 
the bed.
“Why do I need such things just to —?”
“Where!” they interrupt my thought, “Where are the toiletries 
for God?” 
At my despair, which they misinterpret as confusion, they kneel 
and mime a ritual of ablution — one performed a thousand 
times each day — with wide eyes and gaping mouths, drawing 
my attention to the cleaning of the face and ears.  
I understand their question and their enactment, but I have no 
answer. 
I have no toiletries for God, nor to cleanse myself to appear be-
fore God. 
“I just take showers,” I think. “And use Q-tips.” 
My family will be spared, but I will be killed. 
Everyone knows I am not Fundamental. 
I know it myself. 
The question is how I have allowed myself to trespass into a 
Fundamental domain. 
I begin to believe that I deserve my punishment. 
23
a dream of fundamentalist resorts
In this moment, I sense that I am, at heart, a Fundamentalist.
But it is too late. 
As I am hoisted up and carried away like Jesus, I hear the sounds 
of gentle fountains, children laughing, and people splashing in 




Poésie Banlieue, or, the Plano Suicides 
 
1.
In the suburbs, gods are satisfactions. 
Needs, therefore, blaspheme. 
Unmet needs convert to ectomies, 
which are insatiable and can only be filled up. 
Some parents fill up their ectomies with children, 
who are given unto suburban gods.
2.
Our environs were pretty pitches. 
Yet suburbs are places superior to which we ought to be. 
Mornings we had soft-boiled eggs in scarry mugs: 
little, white, plastic things like outdoor teacups 
or something someone else would throw away.  
It’s not like we refused. 
There was nothing to which we were superior. 
3.
Sliding patio doors rattled potted plants and wooden tables 
whereupon soft-boiled eggs were served.
Streaky windows splintered sunlight on cat fur 
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and discolored spots of carpet, 
on linoleum floors that smelled vaguely of pine. 
You see, environs fill up ectomies. 
Which is to say we lived in pitches 
— pretty, scarry — 
that became us. 
4.
Suburbs such as ours produced people who would, later, be-
come devoted listeners of Rush Limbaugh (2012a; 2012b), who 
dropped out of a suburban college and taught himself to say 
the terrible, sarcastic things the protolimbaughlisteners only 
thought:  
When you’ve taken more than your share and then you use 
that to flee the city, well, then you are held in contempt. And 
you have to be gotten even with […]. The suburbs stole the 
wealth of the inner city […]. In suburbia, that’s where the 
good schools are. That’s where the clean malls are […]. Re-
member, the rich are to blame for everything. The achievers, 
those who succeed on their own, they are the ones to blame 
for all of these problems. You fled the inner cities when they 
needed you most. You took your money and you took your 
life and you took everything to the suburbs, and you left 
those who couldn’t afford to go with nothing. 
We knew who they were: children proud and angry, safe and 
dangerous. 
No matter what we thought of the protolimbaughlisteners, 
we believed they loved themselves because their mothers loved 
them passionately. 
(We were not politically correct and did not think of fathers 
because, frankly, in the suburbs of the 1970s and 1980s, mothers 
did most of the loving, or were supposed to.) 
It was impossible not to be jealous of the mothers’ love that, 
we thought, surely warmed, like sunlit windows unbesmirched 
27
Poésie Banlieue
by streaks, the tidy houses of the protolimbaughlisteners, a love 
that permitted its conferrees to experience their every wretched 
impulse as a kind of poetry. 
We may not have stolen money or abandoned anyone, but 
our neighborhoods were, indeed, built on theft and segregation. 
5.
At first, we rode bikes in stripmall parking lots. We smoked 
stolen low-tar cigarettes behind back-yard fences. We played 
in drainage pipes and dry, dirt fields. We loaded poorly hidden 
handguns. We got beaten up by parents and big brothers and 
football coaches and Deans of Discipline. We woke our teachers 
when they fell asleep at their desks.  
In 1983 and 1984, a lot of us killed ourselves. 
Again, in 1999, a lot more of us: half deliberately, half only 
half-deliberately, from heroin.  
First, they called our deaths clusters, as in bombs or granola. 
Then, they called them waves, as in tidal or “of grain.” 
Everyone feigned paroxysmal wordlessness and hid unwant-
ed metaphorical boners.
Plano, Texas became “the suicide capital of the United States” 
(Block 2011; Durington 2008). 
People loved that we amateurly shot average-quality dope 
and asphyxiated ourselves in pre-owned cars in attached ga-
rages.  
These undesirable surprises validated surprising American 
desires: that a middling teenaged anybody could have a decent 
home of eggs and sunlight, play in the varsity game, hook up 
with a Chili’s hostess, and then snuff himself right out. 
“I think what parents in this situation find offensive,” said a 
Dallas psychologist who requested not to be named, “is that by 
killing themselves, their sons and daughters are committing an 
ultimate act of rejection.”  
“The parents have worked to build what they consider the 
perfect lifestyle, and their children are saying […] ‘This lifestyle 
is so painful that I’d rather die.’” (Stiteler 1983).
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Astonishing how much is missed in this statement. 
6.
Banlieue is the French word for suburb. 
It is a better word because a banlieue extends the ban, the 
jurisdiction of a city.
But ban also means the enforcement of the boundary: in and 
out. 
Suburbs (banlieues) are not just places, but states of being 
wherein people find comfort at the perimeters of life, activity, 
interest. 
The lieue in banlieue has nothing to do with a lieu (place)
Lieue is a unit of measure, like a “league,” as in “twenty-thou-
sand under.”
Those who inhabit banlieues are not always comfortable. The 
physical comforts of the manifest suburbs attest to the psychic 
discomforts of metaphorical banlieues. 
A banlieue is, by definition, what is not a center. The center is 
the thing to which a banlieue attends and upon which the ban-
lieue depends. The center is that which the banlieue admires, but 
also that which the banlieue rejects. 
A banlieue is banal and a place of abandonment [abandon-
ner: from mettre à bandon]. 
Do suburbanites abandon their centers or have banlieusards 
been abandoned by what is — or what was once — central? Or 
are these two abandonments identical?  
In any case, banlieusards remain bound to the very center 
from which they are banished. 
Without tremendous effort, once banlieusards, we become 
inferior to the central life, thereafter circumnavigated with love 
and hatred, jealously and fear. 
Most of us take our inability to escape our environs as evi-
dence that we’re unqualified for the central life, a life lived in and 
from our centers. 
Most of us dedicate ourselves to re-creating and re-creating 




Once, I walked into a suburban Methodist church on a weekday 
afternoon. 
No parishioners were there, but some workers talked loudly 
in back.
An authoritative woman peered in, scowled at me.
She thought I was doing the talking.
The next time she passed by, I did everything in my power to 
appear silent, even though I was silent. 
There is nothing we can do to appear more silent than we are. 
Rather, there is only one thing we can do to appear more si-




A Dream of Psychoanalysis
 
I enter a “Holistic Center” for the first time and an analyst 
named Gary who wears large, round glasses informs me that he 
has prepared an “area” for me. 
The area is furnished with small desks and daybeds that resem-
ble prison cots. 
Three or four men and women are already there, looking com-
fortable. 
I am asked to sit on the mat in the center of the area. 
I am content because, having been concerned about being un-
able to hear properly, I feel assured that from this position I will 
hear and be heard clearly.
Moreover, I feel confident that the terrible child with one, single, 
extraordinary eyebrow, who is always cutting in and out of my 
telephone calls from some location I shall never discover, will 
not be able to interfere. 
Gary says, “I can assure you that what you will face here is a very 
different kind of enemy.” 
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I sense immediately that Gary is knowledgeable about my en-
emy and about what I will face. 
The session begins with a question about a yarn bracelet I am 
wearing. 
I respond in lies and half-truths, stories about the bracelet’s ori-
gin and meaning I’ve repeated so often I cannot remember, my-
self, whether they are false or true. 
After I finish speaking, perhaps because I am lying, Gary ceases 
to pay attention to me.
The others in the area either have departed or have been extin-
guished from my consciousness.  
I am suddenly aware that I can hear, through the thin walls, 
three or four other sessions going on at the same time. 
I complain about this lack of confidentiality. 
Gary mumbles something about “research purposes.” 
I then notice the playing of psychedelic music, as if it were being 
piped in through a set of invisible speakers. 
I complain again, this time about the invasive music, to which 
Gary responds by pacing around the area.
But Gary does not remain in the area. 
Rather, he conducts personal errands that are both inside and 
outside the area: 
He remains with me but also goes to the ATM. 
He gets gas. 
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He buys fast food. 
He paces. 
I wonder, “Is all of this part of the analysis?” 
I ask Gary, “Can you tell me when we began, so I know when the 
session will be over?” 
Gary tells me the incorrect time. 
I know he has told me the incorrect time, so I ask again.
Now Gary is enraged and flips me off angrily, with both hands, 
while tucking himself into a small cubicle made of white foam-
board. 
I have had enough. 
I scream, “Fuck you!” and “Fuck this!” and begin to feel very 
sorry for myself, which is a pleasurable, even ecstatic, feeling, 
as if I were finally able to register that a hurtful thing was hap-
pening to me. 
In spite of this pleasure, or because of it, I try to leave the “Ho-
listic Center,” but am held back by several enormous attendants, 
who mock my complaint about being flipped off, as if it were 
my fault, as if I had misunderstood the meaning of the gesture. 
They shout, “You are missing the boat, you fat fuck!” 
I am, at this moment, primarily upset that these fat men think 
I am fat. 
But I am also lucid enough to realize — now without the pleas-
ure — that I am being abused.
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The problem is that I have no idea how to act in relation to this 
abuse.
That is, I do not know how to avoid giving the abusers the sat-
isfaction of proving me to be stupid, wrong, or weak, without, 
at the same time, giving up my own true hope that the abuse 
is good for me, which is identical to the wish that my abusers 
and my abuse will offer me answers, comforts, and other crucial 
things I need, which, of course, can only be delivered if I submit 






Audits aren’t all bad, although they seem so. 
They’re hearings, from the Latin, audire. 
The most familiar, the tax audit, is generally unwelcome and, 
for some, a violent intrusion. 
Even in its simplest sense, to be heard is ambivalent because, 
when heard, we may be misunderstood. On the other hand, 
when heard, we may be understood. 
To understand means to “stand amidst,” and so to occupy a 
place to hear. In Old English, undersecan meant to audit or ex-
amine. Even the Old High German root of verstehen means to 
“stand before,” as if to hear or be heard directly. 
Mishearing and misunderstanding are the bulk of the tragic 
and the comic: Euripides, Shakespeare, et cetera. But they are 
incomplete without the understanding that reveals them to miss 
the mark. 
To hear the words that make us understand — or that make 
us understood, which may be the same — can be a blessing or a 
curse, can feel as if we’ve finally achieved our end, or can reveal 
that we’ve been played as fools all along, cast in an involuntary 
audition, danced upon a string. 
When Oedipus finally hears the truth — a truth said, in 
its way, a dozen times, repeated silently inside him dozens 
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more — he hears not merely the messenger’s voice, nor the 
herdsman’s, nor Tiresias’s, nor the Oracle’s, but, finally, his own. 
And when he does, he understands that he is the unwanted 
child, the curse upon his home. 
In the wake of this epitomic audit maudit, it is a testament to 
Sophocles that Oedipus self-enucleates — puts out his eyes — in-
stead of cutting off his ears— auriculectomy — condemning 
himself to hear and hear. 
2.
Audit means audience, too. The audience is everyone, you and 
me, for we are audience to each other and to ourselves, as we 
think or read or write or speak. 
Roland Barthes (1971) would say the audience is the author’s 
collaborator, co-creating what is written or said. Better to say 
the author is the audience’s co-auditor: hearing with. 
It is fine to be an author, of a text or of a life, but it is terrible 
if we are not, at the same time, an audience, if we cannot hear 
ourselves.  
Like the virtuoso who rehearses until she no longer hears the 
notes, we play most urgently to our internal audiences. Even our 
Rachmaninoffs or Bachs, our mothers, fathers, or Gods, are not 
invited. 
In Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, 
the Player (travelling actor) knows, or fears, that without an au-
dience, “by this time tomorrow we might have forgotten every-
thing we ever knew” (1968, 22).  
The real tragedy of these tragedians is that they lack the ca-
pacity to create an audience for themselves and are, therefore, 
enslaved to passers-by. 
Their impotence of audience, if you will, is akin to dire loss, 
even trauma, perhaps death, itself.  
Thus, the Player tells Rosencrantz and Guildenstern the ef-
fect of their abandonment:
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There we are — demented children mincing about in clothes 
that no one ever wore, speaking as no man ever spoke, swear-
ing love in wigs and rhymed couplets, killing each other with 
wooden swords, hollow protestations of faith hurled after 
empty promises of vengeance — and every gesture, every 
pose, vanishing into the thin unpopulated air… Think, in 
your head, now, think of the most… private… secret… in-
timate… thing you have ever done secure in the knowledge 
of its privacy… Are you thinking of it? Well, I saw you do it! 
[…] No one came forward. No one shouted at us. The silence 
was unbreakable, it imposed itself upon us; it was obscene. 
(63–64, emphasis in original) 
Not to have an audience when needed is as obscene and violent 
as to find an unwanted auditor investigating our secret, private 
selves.
There are within us tiny “incommunicado” nuclei that never 
speak to others (Winnicott 1965, 187), but their subtle languages 
may be heard by inner audiences if those audiences are exqui-
sitely understanding. 
Without such inner audiences, these centers are forever si-
lenced, and with them, our capacity to hear, and to be.    
3.
Maudit [pronounced: mō-dē] is French for cursed, from mal + 
dire: to speak ill. 
It may be used casually, like its English equivalent: “C’est un 
maudit bon biscuit!” [“This is a damned good cookie!”]. 
But, more seriously, it is a swear: “Cet audit maudit, c’est un 
cauchemar!” [“This damned audit is a nightmare!”]. 
Although he didn’t coin it, the phrase, “poètes maudits” [ac-
cursed poets] was made famous by Paul Verlaine, ordaining an 
unholy order of suffering artists. Verlaine’s Les poètes maudits 
(1884) celebrated his exalted, abjected group.
Of course, Verlaine did not fail to include himself under 
the anagrammatic pseudonym, Pauvre Lélian (Poor Lélian), al-
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though he was thinking particularly of the curse of his young 
lover, Arthur Rimbaud, whom he shot with a revolver likely in-
tended for himself. 
Imagine, if you will, the auction cry when this weapon, 
drenched in pathos, sold for half a million Euros last year. 
Isabelle de Conihout, perhaps speaking for Christie’s (2016), 
called it “one of the most beautiful literary objects in existence.” 
Sometimes one hears things like this and thinks: “Maudit soit 
le monde” [“Fuck the world”].   
Jeremiah (48:10) writes: “Maudit soit celui qui fait avec négli-
gence l’œuvre de l’Éternel” [“Cursed is he who negligently does 
the work of the Eternal”]. 
But the real curse falls upon those who are neglected [négli-
gés] by l’Éternel, who are never called to the central life, who 
never hear in their names reverberations of eternal interest. 
That likely sounds bourgeois, as there are millions plagued by 
deadly afflictions, living in destitution, violated in unthinkable 
ways, tortured by genocide or war. 
These are extremities of suffering, to be sure, but what makes 
them truly terrible is that they tend to lead the sufferers to lose 
interest in life, which is to say, to lose interest in being alive. 
It is not to trivialize such horrors to remark that such loss is a 
fate worse than the death of the body. 
“[Thomas] Hobbes was wrong when he said people fear their 
own violent death most of all,” as Fred Alford gleaned from tes-
timonies of Holocaust survivors (2009, 90). “Worse is the fear 
that the entire world has been emptied of value, all human at-
tachment, Eros in its largest sense; in this impoverished world, 
only one’s body remains.”
4.
The loss of interest in life is not a mishearing or misunderstand-
ing. Nor is it a mistake, although we are often mistaken in think-
ing that we are interested in our lives when, in fact, we are not. 
The possibility of finding interest in life requires that we have 
developed the capacity to hear our central selves. 
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Likewise, if our children are to discover interest in their lives, 
then in their names they must hear our interest. 
In their infantile cries and, later, in their adolescent and adult 
discourses, they must hear us hearing them. 
Many people are incapable of hearing others because they 
cannot hear themselves. This holds not only for those for whom 
the task of hearing has been made infinitely harder by extraor-
dinary grief or trauma. 
It is the lucky, the gifted, the blessed among us who have been 
heard and who can hear: les (bénits) entendus. 
5.
If we travel, we find not only an abundance of explicit suffering, 
but a profusion of persons for whom life holds no interest. 
Not only have they no external audience, they lack internal 
audiences to attend the performances of their days. This is a 
simple truth we do not wish to hear. 
We’d circle the Earth to avoid it, and, in doing so, find count-
less charming people who are fascinating to us, which is, of 
course, an utterly different matter. 
To discover the truth about the vie maudite, we need only 
walk down a street long enough to find that area without inter-
est, where it would appear as if a terrible machine had shorn 
from everything its vital vibrancy. 
These areas may be middle-class suburbs or poverty-wracked 
regions, wealthy city blocks or trailer parks, Rust Belt townships 
or gated communities, not to mention the uncategorizable plac-
es no one knows how to name, like the lonely farmsteads along 
thoroughfares, or the neglected neighborhoods surrounding 
colleges and universities. 
And that is just America. To go to Mexico, China, England, 





Franz Kafka may be the great modern psychologist of audits 
maudits and misinterest, for he permits them — without nam-
ing them as such — to hold the ambivalence they deserve.  
In “A Hunger Artist,” the eponymous performer starves him-
self for a living. He comes to be dissatisfied with his art, just as 
his audiences lose interest in “the art of fasting.” 
But the artist is unhappy for reasons more complex than the 
public’s. The artist is dissatisfied because he does not wish to 
hear the truth about himself, a truth that only he can hear: that 
his art is no art for him, although he wishes that it were. 
His intimations of his fraud are expressed in his frustration 
projected upon his manager for setting limits to the duration of 
his fasts, not out of concern for the artist’s health but because 
“after [about forty days] the town began to lose interest” (1971, 
271). 
It further annoys the artist that auditors of sorts are assigned 
to verify that he is not eating in secret at night, for the artist 
“would never in any circumstances, not even under forcible 
compulsion, swallow the smallest morsel of food; the honor of 
his profession forbade it” (268–69).  
Even worse are advertisements such as “photographs […] 
showing the artist on the fortieth day of a fast lying in bed al-
most dead from exhaustion. […] What was a consequence of 
the premature ending of his fast was here presented as the cause 
of it! To fight against this lack of understanding, against a whole 
world of nonunderstanding, was impossible” (272–73).
In the end, the artist’s performances cease to attract audi-
ences, and he is hired by a circus and stationed at the periphery, 
along an entrance-route to the main attraction: a mere amuse 
bouche to the eventual entrée.
Neglected, his exhibition falls into disuse, the placard de-
scribing his performance becomes illegible, and the notice 




So, the artist fasts amidst indifference and uncertainty: Even 
he loses track of the duration of his final fast, and although he 
is sure he’s broken every record, he has no proof and no reward. 
He begins to die. 
One day, the circus overseer and attendants pass by what they 
take to be an empty cage, for the hunger artist is so camouflaged 
by carelessness, as it were, that he barely is — which, it should be 
recalled, may well be the artist’s true aim.
They poke around the cage with a stick, find the artist, and 
ask, “Are you still fasting?” and “When on earth do you mean 
to stop?”
To this the hunger artist asks for forgiveness and explains: “I 
always wanted you to admire my fasting [… b]ut you shouldn’t 
admire it.”
When asked why they shouldn’t, the artist explains: “Because 
I have to fast, I can’t help it.”
“Why can’t you help it?”, they wonder, bemused.  
And the artist whispers: “Because I couldn’t find the food I 
liked. If I had found it, believe me, I should have made no fuss 
and stuffed myself like you or anyone else” (276–77).  
We may speculate that the artist was never able to find the 
food he liked because he was never able to hear the call of his 
own hunger, his own desire, and instead, only the desire to be 
a center of attention for others, to nourish them by refusing to 
nourish himself, and so, to (ful)fill himself only by proxy.
What the hunger artist finally admits is that he does not fast 
at all, that his art is a charade, that he is merely averse to food, 
that he is, therefore, nothing special, just a man who eats or does 
not eat according to his preference, like everybody else.  
That he “feeds” on attention rather than on food destroys the 
possibility of interest in his performances, presented as exer-
cises in superhuman self-control, but, in fact, displays of self-
mishearing, loss of appetite, and being barely. 
Perhaps modern audiences are on to him. More likely, mod-
ern audiences are, themselves, so near to being barely that they 
do not wish to see it enacted before them on a stage. 
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Perhaps they’d rather avoid the thought of it altogether, find-
ing distraction in something, anything else, even that which 
is uninteresting, so long as it is lively, such as the panther that 
takes over the artist’s cage. 
The panther eats huge chunks of meat with a “joy of life” 
that “streamed with such ardent passion from his throat that for 
the onlookers it was not easy to stand the shock of it. But they 
braced themselves, crowded around the cage, and did not ever 
want to move away” (277). 
7.
In a parable related to “A Hunger Artist,” Kafka describes “the 
most insatiable people,” such as Kafka himself, as “certain ascet-
ics, who go on hunger-strike in all spheres of life” (1971, 488–89). 
They hope that in doing so they will hear a voice — a polyph-
ony, really — say all of the following at once:
1. You have fasted enough to become special. Now, you may eat 
like others but “it will not be accounted unto you as eating.” 
2. Your fasting will no longer be difficult for you. “You will now 
fast with joy, it will be sweeter than food (at the same time, 
however, you will also really eat).” 
3. “You have conquered the world, I release you from it.” And 
you will now both eat and not eat. 
4. “Though you do not fast completely, you have the good will, 
and that suffices.”  
These are the words a child longs to hear. 
As bizarre as they are, these words carry the central mean-
ings that must be audible within the self, if the self is to hear 
anything else of value.
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A Dream of Not Swinging
 
I am at a swingers’ party with my wife. 
I do not like it at all. 
The other couples are starting to pressure us to do things.
But before anything can be done, we must write the word “sex” 
on a piece of paper and put it in a bowl. 
This ritual has something to do with “consent.” 
I know I will never write it. 
When asked about my resistance, I say, to my own surprise, that 
I feel the way I felt when I lost hope in Austin, Texas.
For several months, I tell the crowd — whose attention turns to 
me without any effort of my own — I chased a feeling of oblitera-
tion, even of death, because — I struggle to find the words — I 
wanted to meet it, because I sought a kinship, because I wished 
to die, or at least would have preferred to die than to go on liv-
ing as I was. 
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At this honest admission, I begin to weep and am surprised by 
my emotions. 
Concerned about the group’s response, I am surprised — now 
for a third time — by the crowd’s immediate and unconditional 
supportiveness. 
Sarah Palin helps me sit down in a soft chair. 
I remain committed to my refusal to partake in swinger sex and 
am ready to leave, but am paralyzed by overwhelming feelings 
of guilt. 
I cannot move from my chair because I am so concerned that I 
have disappointed the group.
I am convinced that I have ruined their swingers’ night, that the 
story I told was a turn-off, that I have abused the group in ways 
more thoughtless, more odious than those in which I feared 






Ten years ago, Wallace Shawn wrote an essay called, “Writing 
About Sex” (2009), reprinted in Harper’s Magazine under the 
title, “Is Sex Interesting?”
I have revived — a euphemism for copied — this title in large 
part because Shawn’s essay neither asks nor answers the titular 
question. 
Part of me wonders if the misleading title was suggested not 
by Shawn but by an enterprising Harper’s editor who, while fail-
ing to grasp Shawn’s piece, nevertheless succeeded in formulat-
ing an intriguing question. 
2.
Is sex interesting? 
I would like to address the matter as fair-mindedly as pos-
sible. 
To that end, I confess that my instinct is to say: “Obviously, 
sex is not interesting.”
I assume there are others, perhaps a majority, whose instinc-
tive responses are opposite. 
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The thing to do, of course, is to get away from intellectual 
instinct — a euphemism for prejudice — altogether, and to think 
the matter through. 
While on the subject of instinct, however, it seems worth-
while to remark that our instincts, whether physical or intel-
lectual, need not be interesting to hold force. That is, we do not 
engage in instinctual activities because they are interesting. 
Of course, some people are uniquely drawn to activities with 
instinctual aspects — and, indeed, what human activity does not 
have some instinctual aspect? Nevertheless, they may be drawn 
to such activities with varying levels of what we might call in-
stinctual engagement. Chefs or restaurant critics, for instance, 
who are interested in food do not approach food primarily as a 
matter of instinct, although their instinctive responses to smells, 
tastes, textures, and colors very likely inform their work. 
Similarly, paleo-scatologists may or may not have instinc-
tual attractions or aversions to feces, but, in either case, we may 
hope, their instinctual attractions or aversions do not enter into 
their scientific work. 
It becomes a different matter if we consider not those who 
take studied approaches to subjects associated with activities 
with instinctual aspects or attributes, but those who are preoc-
cupied with such activities beyond the degree implied by either 
study or instinct. In such cases, we speak not of scatological sci-
ence, but of scatological fetish or coprophilia; not of gastrono-
my or culinary art, but of compulsive eating, food addiction, or 
anorexia.   
Although human sexuality is considerably more complex 
than the phrase, “activities with instinctual aspects” suggests, 
most would agree that sex retains vital connections with in-
stinct, which is merely one way of saying that, whatever we 
mean by “sex” — which is, of course no simple matter — we do 
not ignore the physiology of vasodilation, lubrication, ovula-
tion, ejaculation, and so on. 
To be sure, physiological phenomena are difficult if not im-
possible to separate from emotions and intellects, for even a 
touch may be more or less sexually arousing if it comes from 
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someone who is loved, or if one judges it to be morally wrong. 
At the same time, it is possible to engage in sexual activities with 
which, either by design or by accident, our emotions and intel-
lects are relatively uninvolved. 
That interest is not the driver of instinct cannot be counted 
as evidence that instinctual activity is uninteresting. Neverthe-
less, it is reasonable to assert that instinctual activity — not the 
thought of it, nor the study of it, but the doing of it — is unin-
teresting because it is instinctive, unthought, and unconscious. 
Instinctual doing is boring, by definition. 
3.
I have now introduced a distinction that would get me into trou-
ble among colleagues who argue that distinguishing between 
doing and thinking entrenches a Cartesian, dualistic outlook. 
(What a boring objection this has become!) 
To address the question of the interest of sex we must be able 
to acknowledge that it may be regarded in two ways: as a topic 
of possible intellectual interest and as an activity with which we 
may or may not be engaged, owing to any number of factors, 
one of which may well be our degree of interest in sex. 
If we are so anti-Cartesian as to be unable to accept this 
premise, if we cannot imagine a way to distinguish, even rough-
ly, between thinking and doing, then we are stuck, and we may 
wish to consider how and why we have become so stuck. 
I submit that our stuckness on this point is, in fact, related 
to our opinions concerning the interest of sex, particularly the 
fantasy of fusion that informs our attitudes toward sex and sexu-
ality.
The fantasy of fusion suggests that, in sex, bodies, persons, 
categories of experience, and even contradictory thoughts and 
feelings all collapse into each other, becoming one. 
This fantasy, that sex overcomes difference (and différance), 
duality, subjectivity, sovereignty, individuality, and more, may 
be understood — and, for centuries, even for millennia, has been 
understood — as a counter-point to the outlook we now call 
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Cartesian: a vision of the world as consisting of separate per-
sons, and a vision of persons as having minds that are to some 
degree distinguishable from bodies.
4.
Let us consider this matter in a different way. It is possible — al-
though not necessary or obvious — to regard the basic bodily 
activities of eating, sleeping, sex, excretion, and all the others 
(digesting, breathing, blinking, coughing, and so on) as im-
mensely boring, possibly as the most boring things in the world. 
At the same time, when undertaken in interesting ways or 
with interesting people, at least some of these activities may be-
come interesting. 
If we can speak of the activity of dining and not the thought 
or study of it, we may suggest that, at least for most people, what 
is interesting about dining is not that food happens to be passing 
through their alimentary tracts, but that, if certain conditions 
are met, interesting sensations, including taste, emotions, expe-
riences, contemplations, or imaginations may be had. 
The meal, itself, may have been prepared thoughtfully, crea-
tively, or with a sense of experimentation, and these qualities 
may also be appreciated by the diners. 
In the same way, if we may speak about the doing of sex and 
not the thought or study of it, what is most interesting about sex 
is not that certain body parts, or extensions of body parts, are 
meeting other body parts, but that, if certain similar conditions 
are met, interesting sensations, emotions, experiences, contem-
plations, or imaginations may be had. 
So, we see now why the question of “whether sex is interest-
ing” is, in some important sense, too blunt to answer directly. 
Sex may be interesting if we make sex interesting. To make 
sex interesting, we must remain capable of generating and of 
holding interest in sex while in the presence of the rudimentary 
doing of sex, as it were. 
And to remain capable of this feat, we must discover and re-
spect boundaries between ourselves, as interested persons, and 
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the objects of our interest, just as we must respect the bounda-
ries between ourselves, as interested persons, and the other per-
sons with whom we are sexually engaged or in whom we are 
sexually interested.   
5.
While it is common to say that doing a thing (throwing javelins 
or making music or playing chess) “is interesting,” we typically 
mean that doing a thing sponsors interesting ideas, potentiali-
ties, imaginations, reflections, and so on. These we entertain 
primarily before or after the moments, or micro-moments, of 
immediate doing. 
To borrow the (boringly) popular concept of “flow” from 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990), it is awkward and likely in-
accurate to say that athletes or musicians or chess players who 
are thoroughly engrossed in their activities are — while “in the 
zone” or “in the groove” or “in the moment of flow” — interested 
in javelins or French horns or the Sicilian defense. Rather, they 
are more and less than interested. 
Even the most enthusiastic athlete, musician, or chess player 
must spend hours running laps, practicing scales, rehearsing 
matches, and so on. We all must find a way to appreciate, or at 
least to tolerate, the tedious aspects of what we do, if we are to 
thrive. But no matter what activity we are involved in, we cannot 
remain in a state of “peak” interest throughout the entirety of 
our lives. If we expect to, we are sure to be disappointed. 
What is more, “peak” interest is not likely to be achieved in 
the same moment as “peak” performance. This is but one reason 
why we do not exclaim to our partners, or even to ourselves, 
during sex: “How interesting this sex is!” 
Rather, “peak” interest requires “room” or “space” for inter-
est, where imagination and creativity and reflection can enter 
into what we are doing. Sometimes, this requires a literal or 
figurative separation or “stepping back” from our doing, so that 
we can observe it, consider it, and appreciate it. Sometimes, it is 
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possible to do and to find space to appreciate what we are doing 
simultaneously.   
“But what makes sex interesting,” someone will say, “is pre-
cisely that, in sex, we cease to be capable of stepping back and 
are locked in our doing. We cease to exist as bounded beings or 
separate persons or minds that can wander away and, instead, 
because of the intensity and immediacy of the activity, become 
identified with, enveloped by, intertwined with, enmeshed with 
sex and with those with whom we are sexually engaged.” 
This vision of sex as a kind of eclipse of the separate, thinking, 
potentially interested self I have referred to above as the sexual 
“fantasy of fusion.” It is a fantasy not because it is impossible or 
unreal but because it is a wished-for experience that entails not 
only the wish for engrossing sexual encounters but the wish for 
the loss of the self and the wish to discover, even momentarily, 
that one is indistinguishable from another, that one is a part of 
something greater than one’s self. 
6.
Before anything else, we should remember that sex is not unique 
in its capacity to intertwine or enmesh persons, bodies, and/or 
objects, unless we are thinking of sex in a childishly literal sense. 
There are innumerable events and activities that entan-
gle people and so offer challenges — of varying degrees, of 
course — to their sense of separateness. 
For better or for worse, our sense of separateness may be 
challenged, to a degree equal to if not greater than that invoked 
by sex — by telling a secret, making a home, speaking a terrible 
truth, sharing a terrible lie, discovering a partner, discovering 
one has cancer, giving birth to a child, raising a child, losing a 
child, and more. 
On this point, D.W. Winnicott (1986) reminds us that Ed-
ward Albee’s famous play, “Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf,” de-
picts two persons ensnared in a gruesome struggle over a child 
who does not exist. That is, the child has been conceived only in 
the imagination, not via sexual conception.  
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All sexually active adults have likely had at least one encoun-
ter in which they found their sexual activities to be — deliber-
ately or accidentally — decoupled from their sexual partners. It 
would be quite surprising if most sexually active adults had not 
had at least one experience of doing a sexual thing in a way that 
bore little or no relation to the other person or persons with 
whom they were ostensibly sexually engaged. 
In such instances, although our bodies may have been en-
twined in sexual activity, our thoughts and feelings and imagina-
tions were in different worlds: Perhaps we were still annoyed by 
a nasty email from a colleague, or perhaps we feared we would 
wake up the baby, or perhaps we found ourselves imagining an 
entirely different sex act, or perhaps we found ourselves fanta-
sizing about engaging with an entirely different sexual partner.
The fact that we may have, at one time or another, had sex in 
which we did not achieve the kind of subsumption or envelop-
ment by another that is supposed to be sex’s central virtue has 
not prevented us from continuing to believe that in sex lies a 
rebellion against and an escape from the separate self. 
Thus, the more one considers the sexual fantasy of fusion, 
the more sex appears as but one of many avenues by which we 
experiment with the possibility of not being, i.e., not being our-
selves, becoming less or more, or being something or someone 
else. 
7.
It is awkward to say that a person holds an interest in not being, 
although it is undeniable that not being is a subject replete with 
both fascination and boredom. 
If we can imagine persons interested in not being, then it 
would be well to know what part or parts of those persons hold 
this interest in not being. 
The part of the person that is not? 
The part of the person that is not truly alive, and so wishes 
that the rest of the person would not be along with it? 
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The part of the person that hates the person’s being, and 
wishes only to be involved with doing, so that the person re-
mains hidden, obscured, neglected, unto death? 
The desire to lose oneself, to become something other than 
oneself, or simply not to be are expressions of a lack of interest 
in living, or, put only slightly differently, a lack of interest in liv-
ing as oneself. 
In this way, sexual activity and sexual fantasy are not rooted 
in interest, but in its opposite.  
8.
After sharing drafts of this essay with several colleagues, those 
with expertise in what may be called “sex studies” took me to 
task for failing to engage with the theoretical and critical lit-
eratures on sex and sexuality, whereas I wished to focus on the 
question of the interest of sex, a subject about which very little 
has been written.  
Their objections, I think, were rooted in the sense that I was 
being old-fashioned by not assenting to the contemporary belief 
discussed above: that the interest of sex inheres in its disruptive 
quality: that sex challenges subjectivity and the “fantasy of sov-
ereignty” in some way or other (see Berlant & Edelman 2013).    
It is true that I feel no need to discuss in detail ideas such as 
Jacques Lacan’s famous insistence that “Il n’y a pas de rapport 
sexuel” (1970, 134). Like so many of Lacan’s adages, this one may 
be and has been translated in a variety of ways, including: 
“There is no sexual relation(ship),” and/or, “There is no sex-
ual intercourse,” and/or, “There is no relation between sexes,” 
and/or, “There are no sexes.”
In my view, in any permutation of meaning, this statement is 
more confusing and boring than enlightening and interesting. 
The same may be said for Michel Foucault’s well-known quip 
that “sex is boring” (2000, 253), which, while it would seem to 
cohere with my own thesis, I would argue to be best understood 
as a disingenuous attempt to be provocative, Foucault having 
devoted so much of his life and work to sex and sexuality.   
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As for the others — Reiss or Sedgwick or Dworkin — I dislike 
reading them. Yet mine is not a prudish aversion. I merely find 
it tiresome to read about sex, much in the same way I find it 
tedious to read about “the Anthropocene” or “neoliberalism” or 
“privilege” or, thirty years ago, “globalization.” 
Consider what is offered to those who wish to read about 
sex. On the very first pages of Alenka Zupančič’s (2017) book, 
heralded by Jean Copjec as “an event” that “restores to sex its 
florid obscurity” — as if restoring something to obscurity were a 
good thing for a book to do! — we are told that the person who 
sublimates a sexual urge into, say, talking, does not obtain a sub-
stitute satisfaction of an inferior order. Rather, the person who 
talks achieves a satisfaction in talking that is “exactly the same” 
as the satisfaction of sex. 
What is more, this satisfaction in talking is not only com-
mensurate with that of sex, but “the satisfaction in talking 
is itself ‘sexual’” (2017, 1, emphasis in original), because sex is 
“the operator of the inhuman” (7), which is actually a kind of 
confounding code-phrase for: “that which turns us into human 
subjects.” 
“Human sexuality,” then, is “the point at which the impos-
sibility (ontological negativity) pertaining to the sexual relation 
appears as such, ‘registers’ in reality as its part” (16). 
Talking, playing the piano, writing, whistling, walking: All of 
these activities are “sexual,” on this line of thought. 
Human civilization, itself, is “sexual” because it is “a stand-in 
for something within the sexual which ‘is not’.” 
And even that which we cannot comprehend about our civi-
lization we do not grasp or comprehend because these things, 
too, are sexual, for “Il n’y a de sexe que de ce qui cloche” [“In what 
goes wrong, there is only sex”] (23). 
“When we come across something and have absolutely no 
clue what it is,” Zupančič concludes, “we can be pretty certain 
that it ‘has to do with sex’” (23).   
Here — and not only here — sex becomes that which struc-
tures our reality and that which disrupts it. 
Sex explains everything and underwrites the inexplicable. 
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Sex is the missing link or “short circuit” between ontology 
and epistemology. 
Sex is the root of all knowledge and all confusion. 
Sex is the mysterious essence of Being (see Zupančič, 2017, 
141–42).
After reading such things about sex, I feel a bit as Rimbaud 
must have felt, in his torpor, with his loved and loathed Verlaine, 
writing (1886): 
J’ai fait la magique étude
Du Bonheur que nul n’ élude.
Roughly translated, this means: “I have completed the magical 
study of the Happiness no one escapes.” 
Or, translated to rhyme, and tortured a bit: “I have studied 
the magical shapes of the Happiness no one escapes” (Rimbaud 
2000, 39). 
Both translations obscure an important double meaning in 
the couplet: It is both the Happiness that no one escapes, and the 
study, the research (recherche) that no one escapes. It is to both 
that Rimbaud attributes a certain terrible inevitability, as if they 
were both forced labor. 
There is suffering, for Rimbaud, in this study of happiness. 
The remainder of the poem tells us that it depletes Rimbaud’s 
“envie” [“desire”], takes charge of Rimbaud’s life, steals Rim-
baud’s “âme et corps” [“soul and body”], and dissipates “tous ef-
forts” [“all Rimbaud’s efforts”]. 
Why? 
In an irony that Lacanians will understand but will not ap-
preciate, virtually all writing about sex overloads the signifier 
(“sex”) such that it, in turn, overwhelms any signifieds to which 
it might refer.
That is to say: “Sex” overwhelms the other signifiers to 
which it may be related, collapsing the fragile web of significa-
tion — meaning — in which we live. 
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I do not wish to delve deeply into semiotics here, but it should 
be clear that there is no question of treating “sex” as a signal or 
direct representation of a “raw object” or “real phenomenon.” 
“Sex” is a concept that, at best, refers us to other concepts in a 
signifying chain, never directly to a “thing-in-itself.” 
To understand this, alone, suggests that there may be limited 
value to quibbling over whether we are discussing the concep-
tual interest of sex or the interest of participating in sex acts. To 
be sure, we have concepts both for sexual activity and for think-
ing about sex, and these concepts are distinct. But the problem 
of the overwhelming signifier arises before this distinction has a 
chance to matter. 
In spite of the pretense of understanding, or the pretense of 
wishing to understand, the nature and meaning of sex — the ti-
tle of Zupančič’s book is: What Is Sex? — those who write about 
sex often make sex less understandable, and I see no reason to 
assume that this result is accidental.  
Often, those who write about sex break the sign that is “sex.”
That is, they destroy the relation between the signifier (“sex”) 
and the concept signified, seemingly in order to re-enact within 
their texts the fantasy that already underwrites them: that “sex” 
is a disruptive force. 
The study (recherche) of sex is conducted, again and again, 
but the meaning of sex is broken, again and again, perhaps in 
order to make “sex” seem “raw,” and “real,” perhaps in order to 
preserve the fantasy of sex as the great prison-break, the escape 
from signification, meaning, being, and thought. 
Needless to say, the result is a discourse about sex that suc-
ceeds in reifying (i.e., making concepts into things-in-them-
selves) “sex,” but also makes “sex” utterly incomprehensible and 
profoundly boring.
9.
There is more than a little (semi-conscious, unconscious) ag-
gression at work here. Making sex boring — allowing “misinter-
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est” to pervade the discourses of sex — is akin to a kind of mys-
tification of sex, barring opportunities to make sex meaningful. 
Consider the presentation of the following information 
(fig.  1) to an audience — even an audience of initiates — under 
the pretense of facilitating their understanding or interest (La-
can 1975, 73). 
Lacan’s famous description of sexuation and sexual differ-
ence — in which the left column refers to the “male” and the 
right, the “female” — presents one obvious (formal) logical con-
tradiction — “Everyone is submitted to the phallic function,” 
and “There exists someone who is not submitted to the phallic 
function.” 
This contradiction, then, is transformed into a source of mys-
tery (see Boudry 2014), and, then, into the kind of fascination 
inspired by the suggestion of a knowledge that escapes thought. 
Indeed, Lacan warns his audience: “After what I just put on 
the board, you may think you know everything. Don’t” (1998, 
78). 
How could we? 
Why is it important to chasten us for thinking as much? 
And doesn’t this act of chastening, itself, suggest that Lacan 
does, in fact, know everything, even or especially that which is 
unknowable?  
If the ways in which we write about sex degrade or destroy 
our thinking about it, and, therefore, degrade or destroy any 
mature interest we may have in it, then, in spite of presumptions 
Figure 1. The diagram of sexual difference. © J. Lacan, CC BY 4.0.
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about sex’s interest, they betray an impulse not to think about 
sex, not to understand sex, not to make sex meaningful, and, 
strangest of all, not to make sex interesting. 
The despair and ennui of Rimbaud, although enjoying what 
was by all accounts a vibrant, yet also violent, romantic life with 
Verlaine, when considered in the light of our efforts to keep sex 
beyond our understanding, suggests that sex is perhaps best de-
scribed as a subject of fascination and a subject of boredom at 
the same time. 
The combination of fascination and boredom is an experi-
ence for which we do not have a word. 
I have suggested the term “misinterest,” although I am always 
hesitant to invent a new piece of jargon. 
Whatever we choose to call it, this coincidence of fascina-
tion and boredom is not at all the same as interest. In fact, it is 
perhaps the closest thing we have to interest’s opposite, working 
directly against it. 
10.
Someone will say: “Few subjects in the history of human civili-
zation have received as much attention as sex. Surely such sus-
tained attention proves that sex is interesting.” 
First, we might benefit from considering the meaning of “in-
terest” in relation to attention, a subject which, perhaps ironi-
cally, has not been of great interest to philosophers or psycholo-
gists. 
William James understood interest to be the cause of atten-
tion: “The things to which we attend are said to interest is. Our 
interest in them is supposed to be the cause of our attending” 
(1950, 416).  
And others have followed suit by defining interest as the “co-
native” quality of our attention (Berlyne 1949), which is about 
as helpful as saying, to cite the famous fallacy, that opium puts 
people to sleep because of its soporific properties.  
John Dewey introduced a rather important psychological 
term into the question of the meaning of interest by suggesting 
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that the aim of interest is the “identification” of the interested 
person with the object of interest (1913, 27), so that the person 
must be interested in it, lest she lose interest in her very self. 
It is a revolting idea, especially if we recall that much of 
Dewey’s work was intended to be used — and continues to be 
used — as a guide for inculcating interest in school-aged chil-
dren and young adults for the advancement of politically and 
economically rewarding ends. 
It is tempting to imagine that the psychological phenomenon 
we call “interest” is related to the moral and economic construct 
we call “self-interest” — because, presumably, when we take an 
interest, we see in interest’s object something that holds the po-
tential to enrich us.
But interest, in the psychic sense, is not an instrument. We 
are not interested instrumentally, in order to enrich ourselves. 
Or, at least, it is not very helpful to use the term, “interest,” to 
describe this kind of appropriative attention. 
We may say, in a casual sense, that so-and-so is interested in 
earning money, but we rarely mean that this person finds money 
interesting. 
Rather, paradoxically, the pursuit of interest is disinterested. 
And the destruction of psychic interest appeals (unconsciously) 
to our self-interest, even to our greed, from which real interest 
may be a distraction, or worse. 
It may appear ironic that, in an age of capitalism and individ-
ualism, where our “attention” suffers “deficits” and where many 
are driven to distraction, we would seek to destroy interest. 
Any irony here is merely apparent because, even if we en-
visage self-interest as “self-interest properly understood,” it is 
well-known that individuals, groups, and societies frequently 
act in ways contrary to their own proper interests: We damage 
the environment, we make laws and support norms that impov-
erish us and make us unhappy, we repeat destructive patterns in 
behaving and relating.  
Rather, to be interested in something is to open a channel 
of communication, to enter an auditorium, if you will, between 
persons and interesting objects, which may be ideas, other per-
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sons, things, et cetera. Self-interest guards against interest be-
cause interest implies an opening, a communication with some-
thing central in our selves. 
The most important interest is interest in being, in living as 
oneself. 
This interest requires an internal audience that both hears 
and is heard. 
To develop this internal audience one must have been for-
tunate enough to have had external audiences to internalize, as 
well as a capacity to bear the possibility not only of being mis-
understood but, what may feel even more terrifying, of being 
understood.
Those who lack these audiences and capacities avoid interest 
like the plague (see also How To Be a Victim: Camus’s Plagues 
and Poisons, this volume). 
11.
To return to the hypothetical objection raised earlier — that 
sustained historical attention to sex proves that sex is interest-
ing — we might also reply by inquiring whether our persever-
ance in attending to sex really evinces its interest, or, rather, re-
flects, to borrow an ugly term from psychiatry, a perseveration, a 
preoccupation, a compulsion, an obsession, a fascination? 
Is it not likely that our attention to sex — and there is no de-
nying that we attend to it relentlessly — expresses not an interest 
rooted in the intellectual and emotional potentialities sex may 
hold for us, but, rather, a perseveration rooted in a fascination 
with compulsive, rote, and repetitive activity, i.e., a boring per-
severation?  
Let us consider what it means to “fascinated.” As Gustave 
Le Bon describes it, the fascinated person has “entirely lost his 
conscious personality” and has become, instead, “an automaton 
who has ceased to be guided by his will.” 
“The state of ‘fascination’” is the state “in which the hypno-




If we are fascinated by sex, on this account, what draws us 
to sex is not interest but something far less intelligible, far less 
conscious. 
The word “fascination” captures it well, being derived from 
the Latin fascinare, meaning to bewitch, enchant, even enslaved. 
Perhaps being bound to sex, in this sense, is what binds us to 
sex, in another sense. In any case, to be spell-bound is not to be 
interested. 
Psychological ambivalence plays an important role in fasci-
nation, because that which fascinates us does so because we find 
ourselves enticed and repulsed. 
We are rarely aware of our ambivalences, and we are often 
incapable of admitting them to ourselves or others. 
Thus, it is not uncommon to mistake ambivalence for fasci-
nation, since we keep coming back to that about which we are 
most conflicted, as if returning to the scene of a crime we wish 
both to erase and to endlessly repeat.
Where there is ambivalence, there is hiding, or, to use the psy-
chological term: repression. What we repress are the “valences” 
with which we are most uncomfortable. We acknowledge love in 
the family more readily than hate, revulsion at death more read-
ily than revulsion at birth, the allure of sex more readily than the 
allure of violence. 
Susan Sontag’s (1975) review essay, “Fascinating Fascism,” 
worries about the popularity of fascistic imagery. Despite the 
appearance suggested by her title, one has to go back quite a 
distance to find an etymological link between “fascism” and 
“fascination,” beyond any modern language, beyond Latin and 
ancient Greek, and ultimately to the Proto-Indo-European root, 
bhasko, meaning something like a bundle or band or, perhaps, 
phallus (see Watkins 2000).  
For Sontag, fascism sponsors fascination because we are fas-
cinated by sadomasochistic sexuality, by “situations of control, 
submissive behavior […] relations of domination and enslave-
ment […] the turning of people into things [… or] the orgiastic 
transactions between mighty forces and their puppets.” 
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Of course, not all sex is sadomasochistic and thus, to allude 
to her essay here is not to imply that our long-standing fascina-
tion with sex can be accounted for by fascination with sado-
masochistic sex. Rather, we may be fascinated both with fascism 
and with sex to the extent that part of us wishes to submit to the 
force of sex. If fascism can be, for lack of a better term, “sexy,” it 
is also true that, even absent patent elements of sadomasochism, 
sex can be fascistic. 
Think of Wallace Stevens’s early poem “Le Monocle de Mon 
Oncle,” whose title, aside from being silly, alludes to the view-
point of a more mature “uncle,” or — if one considers vulgar 
slang terms for the phallus, such as “one-eyed snake” — an un-
cle’s penis. 
The most memorable stanza (XI) begins: 
If sex were all, then every trembling hand
Could make us squeak, like dolls, the wished-for words. 
(1990, 17)
Thank goodness we are not wind-up dolls, squeaking out deter-
mined words, however wished-for those words may be. 
Instead, the “unconscionable treachery of fate” — to be said 
with tongue in cheek — has both exiled (banned) us and liber-
ated us from a half-Edenic, half-sexually-totalitarian state in 
which we resided in our youth. As we mature, we live, think, and 
act in other regions and on other registers, “without regard / To 
that first, foremost law” (17). 
Early in Plato’s Republic, Socrates and his friends meet Ceph-
alus, a man who is “as the poets say, about to cross the thresh-
old” into death (328e). Cephalus tells them that, unlike many of 
his elderly acquaintances who lament their waning libidos and 
the loss of their youthful enjoyments, he finds himself content. 
“In fact,” he continues 
I was once present when someone was asking the poet 
Sophocles about sex, and whether he was still able to make 
love to a woman; to which he replied, “Don’t talk about that; 
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I am glad to have left it behind me and escaped from a fierce 
and frenzied master.” A good reply I thought then, and still 
do. For in old age you become free of feelings of this sort and 
they leave you in peace, and when your desires lose their in-
tensity and relax, you get what Sophocles was talking about, 
a release from a lot of mad masters. 
This notion of sex as “mad” master, or as law, or as hypnotizer 
or puppeteer, suggests, of course, that, in sex, one may not be 
one’s own master, that sex may take command and compel one 
to (boringly) comply. 
To the extent that we entertain this fantasy about sex, in 
which we are disrupted by another, we may actually be identify-
ing not with the vulnerable, open subjectivities we praise but 
with the mad master, the sovereign of sex, Sex Rex, as it were. 
Whether we find this possibility sexually arousing or not, it 
remains true that, to the extent that we experience sex as ruler, 
law, or superior power, as something that subjugates or objecti-
fies us, sex cannot really hold interest for us, as we are incapable 
of generating and holding onto our own interest while in a sub-
jugated, objectified state. 
12.
Consider the following possibilities, which cannot be proven, 
nor disproven:
Interest is impossible without understanding. 
Without understanding, what might have been an object of 
interest can become only an object of fascination, or boredom, 
or both. 
We become fascinated with that which we do not understand 
in part because we do not understand it. 
We may begin by feeling dominated and even bored by that 
which we do not understand to the degree that it is opaque. It 
withholds from us, or seems to withhold from us, what is inter-
esting in it. 
And yet, this withholding frustrates and fascinates us.
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We attribute to it a mysterious power. 
The object that cannot be understood is a screen for our pro-
jections, a totem for occult worship.
To relate to this object is not to relate to the object, itself, but 
to that which imposes upon the object. 
We can only be interested in that to which we can relate. 
13.
Teaching a university class in which students and I encounter a 
text or film that contains sexual material can be an interesting 
or boring experience, depending in large part on the class’s will-
ingness to consider the possibility that sex is more or less than 
what it seems to be. 
In many films, for example, sex is portrayed as both the evi-
dence and apex of intimacy. It seems to me that sex is so prev-
alent in film mainly because sex is visually transmissible and 
titillating, whereas the complex emotions and qualities of rela-
tionship for which sex is sometimes but a crude metaphor — in-
cluding not only intimacy, but desire, love, need, aggression, 
greed, and despair — are less so. 
Likewise, class discussions about sex are interesting or bor-
ing depending upon the degree of stuckness the group evinces 
in thinking about such subjects, which may be understood in 
terms of at least two main sources of resistance: (1) resistance to 
the possibility that sex is understandable in terms that are not 
themselves sexual, and (2) (what amounts to the same thing) re-
sistance to the idea that sex may be — but need not be — a physi-
cal expression of something more important than sex, such that 
films or texts that seem to be about sex may not be about sex at 
all. 
“What could be more important than sex?” someone will 
ask, perhaps with a laugh. 
“Eros,” one might answer, which includes not just sex but in-
terest in life, in the self and in others, love, attachment, mean-
ingfulness, and vitality, all combined into one. 
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One can have Eros without having sex, and one can have sex 
without having Eros.
It seems important, in classrooms and elsewhere, to reflect 
on the possibility that sex may be used as a substitute for, dis-
traction from, or denial of Eros. 
14.
Someone will say, again perhaps with a laugh: “If you doubt that 
sex is interesting, you must be doing it wrong.”
This hypothetical riposte — along the lines of Louis Arm-
strong’s well-known claim that “if you have to ask what jazz is, 
you’ll never know” — is both misguided and subtly aggressive. 
It is misguided because no one would insist that someone 
who doubts the interest of jogging or watching soap operas 
must be incapable of performing either of those activities. Such 
a comment would not even elicit a smile or a laugh, just confu-
sion. 
It is aggressive because it is, essentially, a joke, and, as we 
might have learned from Freud (1960), jokes typically come at 
someone’s expense. Jokes activate and release, in socially accept-
able forms, aggressive impulses. 
This particular joke neuters its target, implying that the per-
son who doubts the interest of sex must be incompetent, flaccid, 
impotent, or sexually inadequate in some way. 
In this case, I am the hypothetical target of my own hypo-
thetical attack, so I use the gender-specific terms, “flaccid” and 
“impotent.” 
But the same joke could be applied, and has been applied, 
with considerably oppressive intent, to women who dared to 
question the interest of sex. In such cases, the joke-makers sim-
ply change the derogatory terms from “flaccid,” for instance, to 
“frigid.” 
The joke turns the question of interest on its head, trans-
forming what began as an inquiry into a threat: “If you are not 
interested in sex, then sex won’t be interested in you.” 
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So, when Armstrong says, “you’ll never know,” he exiles the 
targets of his joke, insisting that they shall never belong. He es-
tablishes a barrier and a ban around the group and casts out not 
necessarily jazz musicians or jazz critics or even jazz haters but 
anyone who would inquire about the definition of the activity 
that holds the group together. 
What holds the group together is what, in psychoanalytic 
language, we call “the good object.” The good object — in this 
case, jazz — must not be thought about or questioned or doubt-
ed. It may, on the other hand, be able to withstand criticism or 
disparagement if criticism or disparagement serves to affirm to 
the group that the outsiders do not understand, thereby turning 
condemnation into praise and re-assuring the group about the 
value of the good object and of those dedicated to it. 
The same process is operative when we insist upon sex’s in-
terest: Sex, if considered as a “good object,” might punish us if 
we ask or think too much about it. 
According to the joke, those who inquire about what jazz 
is — i.e., those who think about it — do not “get it.” They will 
never get it, according to Armstrong, and, what is more, they 
should not get it. 
Their efforts to get it (where “get it” means “comprehend it”) 
make it impossible for them to get it (where “get it” means “par-
take in it”) because their efforts to think about it threaten the 
group’s possession of it. 
The group seems to have a strong interest in not thinking 
about itself and its primary activity. If Armstrong is right, then 
jazz musicians and jazz aficionados do not think about what jazz 
is. I doubt this is true, but it is certainly true that, while playing 
jazz, one does not spend much time thinking about whether or 
not the music one is playing qualifies as jazz. To do so would be 
to disrupt the experience of playing, and, like the centipede who 
begins to wonder which foot to put out first, to trip oneself up. 
These speculations may be applied to the hypothetical rejoin-
der about sex: “If you don’t get it (where ‘get it’ means ‘com-
prehend whether or why sex is interesting’), you will not get it 
(where ‘get it’ means ‘get to have sexual activity or intercourse’) 
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because those who do have sexual activity intercourse might 
lose it if forced to think about it.”
Why? 
Might they lose their capacity to do it? 
Might they lose interest in it?  
There are, of course, important differences between playing 
jazz and thinking about jazz, between having sex and thinking 
about sex. For some reason, these differences are elided in the 
jokes and quips we have been discussing, which are, essentially, 
insistences that an activity will be ruined if it is thought about.   
To think about sex’s interest — rather than just assuming or 
believing that it is interesting — suggests that there is room for 
doubt about sex’s ability to hold interest, or, put another way, 
our ability to hold interest in sex. 
This room for doubt is the same room that is needed if there 
is to be interest. 
Room for interest is coincidental with room for doubt.  
But making room for interest, like making room for doubt, 
may conjure misgivings about the value of sex as well as all those 
activities related to sex and sexuality in which many of us find 
ourselves involved. Sex comprises, of course, far more than a 
loosely defined set of bodily activities: It is a vast human en-
terprise related to our identities, our relationships, our cultures 
and polities, our wish to find meaning in sexual attractiveness 
and engagement, our experiences of art, literature, poetry, his-
tory, mythology, and much more. 
When we insist that something must not be thought about, we 
are consciously enabling the psychic mechanism of repression, 
since we are saying: “Certain thoughts must not be thought.” 
Repression reveals the part of our ambivalence we wish to hide 
from ourselves and others: in this case, disinterest in, disdain 
for, even repulsion at sex. 
As a musician, or former musician, I feel qualified to say that 
most musicians hold powerfully ambivalent feelings about mu-
sic, often loving it, often hating it, sometimes dreading it, fre-
quently refusing to listen to it at all, yet sometimes discovering 
in it something wonderful. 
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This idea may seem odd to those who watch live musical per-
formances or who listen to musicians speak — and lie — about 
their lifelong, unwavering, and unequivocal love of music. The 
reality is much closer to Marianne Moore’s famous poem about 
poetry and entitled, “Poetry,” which begins: 
“I, too, dislike it.” 
“There are things,” Moore continues, “that are important be-
yond all / this fiddle.” 
And yet, it is also true that: “Reading it […] with a perfect 
contempt for it, one / discovers in / it after all, a place for the 
genuine” (1994, 36). 
15.
So when Wallace Shawn, an intelligent and admirable man in so 
many respects, writes an apologia for having written so much 
about sex, why is he unable or unwilling to address the question 
of whether sex is interesting? 
Perhaps his own fascination with, boredom with, or misin-
terest in sex are kept out of sight, even for him, even from the 
start. 
Or perhaps Shawn is afraid of the (Freudian) threat we’ve 
just discussed: “If you doubt the interest of sex, then you won’t 
get it anymore.” On this note, Shawn’s essay does begin with an 
acknowledgment of his age (sixty-four, at the time of writing). 
Shawn’s tone is so friendly that it may appear humorless to 
take the essay apart claim by claim. And yet, his disarming style 
is involved in the subtlety with which he advances his claims. 
He begins by explaining that he is not at all responsible for 
what he has written, but that, rather, he is a mere vessel for an-
other voice, a voice that “contributes everything,” while he con-
tributes “nothing.” 
Rather, as a writer, he listens as a “voice […] comes in through 
the window, whose words I write down in a state of weirded-out 
puzzlement, thinking, ‘Jesus Christ, what is he saying?’.” 
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When I try to define the voice, I say, weakly, “Oh, that’s the 
unconscious,” but I’m eventually forced to conclude that, 
if the unconscious has thoughts, it has to have heard these 
thoughts (or at least their constituent fragments) from hu-
man beings of some description. (2009, 157)
The unconscious, by definition, does not have “thoughts.” We 
could debate the content of the unconscious, but no one would 
seriously defend the notion that it is, as Shawn implies, made up 
solely of overheard conversations or items one has read about or 
spoken of with others. 
This seems to me to be a rather ineffective attempt on Shawn’s 
part to distance himself from his own writing, to locate the “in-
terest” of sex in other people, and to present himself as little 
more than a translator of the world’s concerns, even if he has to 
locate those interests and those people, first, outside his window, 
then in his ear, and ultimately in his unconscious (about which 
he claims to be conscious). 
Shawn’s next line of argument is that “sex is shocking,” that 
human beings do not typically imagine themselves as being 
involved with sex, but, rather, as being occupied with more 
“uniquely human” things, such as hailing a taxi or voting in an 
election. Instead, when he remembers or is made aware that he, 
too, engages in sex, he is unexpectedly reminded that 
my soul and body are capable of being totally swept up in 
a pursuit and an activity that pigs, flies, wolves, lions, and 
tigers also engage in, my normal picture of myself is violently 
disrupted. In other words, consciously, I am aware that I am a 
product of evolution, and I am part of nature. […] Sex is “the 
environment” coming inside. (159–60)
It is worth remarking the sexual nature of Shawn’s account of his 
own writing about sex. First, Shawn implies that he writes about 
sex so often because people and voices are always penetrating 
his body and his mind. Then, he defines the very fact of human 
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sexuality as an act of penetration and disruption by “the envi-
ronment” which “com[es] inside.”
It is surprising that someone of Shawn’s experience and in-
tellect would genuinely find sex shocking, particularly for the 
reasons — which may not be the real reasons; only the ones you 
can write about in Harper’s Magazine — Shawn sets forth. To be 
sure, there can be shocking moments in sex, moments of sur-
prise, wonder, creativity, or even terror shared between sexual 
partners. These, however, are not typically moments of primi-
tive animality, but the opposite: moments when people recog-
nize themselves and each other and rediscover their capacities 
to create, or to fail to create, a human experience that is all their 
own. 
With all due respect, the bulk of Shawn’s essay is unremark-
able. His final claim, however, is bizarre enough to deserve men-
tion. Shawn writes that “sex seems capable of creating anarchy,” 
and his defense of this point is that the New York Times does not 
print pictures of naked people. 
Shawn asserts that “nudity somehow seems to imply that 
anything could happen” (162), and that this is why the staid and 
reliable Times could never publish nudes, as if doing so would 
create a sort of mass panic: Manhattanites bolting from their 
brownstones, tearing out each other’s guts, copulating in a Bac-
chic frenzy.
The fantasy that underlies this absurd notion is, of course, an 
ancient, common, and, frankly, boring one, in which we may see 
the root of Shawn’s fascination with sex. Shawn imagines that 
sex and nudity — nudity’s relation to sex is never made clear, by 
the way — hold magical powers, powers that are not precisely 
preternatural but, rather, Natural with a capital “N.” 
The idea — one that has been heard since the birth of Attic 
tragedy and likely long before — is that sex is so Natural that it 
drives us “wild.” When we enter the “wilderness” of sex, we leave 
our cities, our manners, our clothing, and all that represents our 
civilized identities behind. 
Thus, “sex really is a nation of its own,” for Shawn. “Those 
whose allegiance is given to sex at a certain moment withdraw 
70
misinterest
their loyalty temporarily from other powers. It’s a symbol of the 
possibility that we might all defect for one reason or another 
from the obedient columns in which we march” (163).  
But if sex is one power, one order, among many, then there 
is no reason to believe that, in the “Nation of Sex,” we have any 
fewer responsibilities or any fewer “obedient columns” in which 
to march. Indeed, it seems a rather tragic fantasy to believe that 
we must leave our selves behind in order to find our selves and 
our Natural interest elsewhere, in a foreign nation we may visit 
briefly, but where we can never reside. 
16.
In one of the most memorable pieces of writing in all of Con-
tinental philosophy, Either/Or, Volume 1: The Rotation Method, 
Søren Kierkegaard offers an exposition of what would otherwise 
be a boring distinction between two types of “rotation”: (1) rota-
tion as endless change, and (2) rotation oriented to and limited 
by the aim of cultivation, as in agriculture. 
In the first, the “vulgar and inartistic method,” we find 
Shawn’s and others’ attitudes toward sex, as we are drawn to 
repeated “change[s] of field” (Kierkegaard 1946, 25). The allure 
of sex, we may extrapolate, is the allure of movement, novelty, 
change of scenery. In practice, this explains why sex so often 
compels people to seek new partners, new positions, new roles, 
and the like. 
There is a childish quality to this method of “rotation,” for it 
forgets, and keeps forgetting, again and again, that such change 
is superficial. It is, moreover, “supported by illusion”: specifically, 
the illusion that the next change will be more meaningful than 
the last. “One tires of living in the country,” writes Kierkegaard,
and moves to the city; one tires of living in one’s native land, 
and travels abroad; one is europamüde [Euro-weary], and 
goes to America, and so on; finally one indulges in a sen-
timental hope of endless journeyings from star to star. […] 
One tires of porcelain dishes and eats on silver; one tires of 
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silver and turns to gold; one burns half of Rome to get an idea 
of the burning of Troy. (25)
Such change is repetitive — as oxymoronic as that may 
sound — because change becomes a constant, a compulsion. 
The compulsion is supported by illusion because the change 
involved actually signifies the absence of, even the defiance of, 
change. 
The illusion that supports such change, along with the idea of 
sex being “a nation of its own,” is the illusion that, by changing 
some more or less superficial aspects of our lives, or by engag-
ing briefly in an activity that bears an unclear relation to the rest 
of our daily activities, we will re-create or re-discover what is 
elusive but essential: our interest in living. 
As a young man and undergraduate student, I found Ki-
erkegaard engaging and liberating, in large part because of the 
essay cited above, in which he dares to claim that the history 
of the world is boring. I suppose this idea, when considered at 
an age when one is told one must be interested in everything 
if one is not to be a boor — which makes real interest impos-
sible — came as something of a relief.  
“Boredom is the root of all evil,” writes Kierkegaard. “What 
wonder, then, that the world goes from bad to worse, and that 
evils increase more and more, as boredom increases.”
The history of this can be traced from the very beginning of 
the world. The gods were bored, and so they created man. 
Adam was bored because he was alone, and so Eve was cre-
ated. Thus boredom entered the world, and increased in pro-
portion to the increase of population. Adam was bored alone; 
then Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve 
and Cain and Abel were bored en famille; then the popula-
tions of the world increased and the peoples were bored en 
masse. To divert themselves they conceived the idea of con-
structing a tower high enough to reach the heavens. This 
idea is itself as boring as the tower was high […]. The na-
tions were scattered over the earth, just as people now travel 
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abroad, but they continue to be bored. […] And is anything 
being done now? […] It is proposed to call a constitutional 
assembly. Can anything more tiresome be imagined, both for 
the participants themselves, and for those who have to hear 
and read about it? It is proposed to improve the financial 
condition of the state by practicing economy. What could be 
more tiresome? (22–23)
17.
These reflections lead me to conclude with what will be consid-
ered an unlikely and perhaps unfortunate topic on the subject of 
sexual interest: US President Donald Trump. 
Having read and studied much of what there is to read and 
study about the election that brought this man to power, I have 
concluded that, more likely than accounts of the “forgotten, 
white, lower-middle class,” millions of Americans were desper-
ately bored, so they elected Trump. 
Trump was and is the bloated, overwhelming signifier, point-
ing to nothing, with which half of America (or more than half) 
became fascinated. 
To presume that Trump could have risen to power only by 
force of American racism, sexism, classism, bigotry, and other 
forms of malice would be to neglect the power of misinterest, of 
boredom and fascination, to influence human conduct. 
The power of misinterest can hardly be overestimated; it of-
ten exceeds the powers of love and hate. 
The problem is that Americans have been told for quite a long 
time that they must be interested in things in which they are not 
interested; indeed, in things that are boring, such as American 
government and politics.  
Without any clear means of making government and poli-
tics interesting, people like Donald Trump, Rush Limbaugh, 
and others fulfill an important psychic and social need: They 
resolve the dissonance between (a) the expectation that govern-
ment and politics be interesting and the reality that (b) without 
73
is sex interesting?
outlandishness and grotesquerie, government and politics are 
boring. 
They do not make politics interesting, but they collude in 
the destruction of what precious little is potentially interesting 
about government and politics in order to magnify both the 
boring and the fascinating. 
Put another way, millions of Americans became fascinated 
by Trump because Trump reflected and represented their bore-
dom. Trump was and is the raging child in the grocery store, 
howling at the excruciating pain of his boredom. 
Trump, the bored child, became fascinating to millions of 
bored American adults because he was childish enough or hon-
est enough or naïve enough to admit how bored he was by all 
workings, principles, and norms of humanity, law, government, 
and politics.  
The Democratic Party has not yet caught on to this. 
It may be time for liberals to launch a years-long campaign 
aimed solely at convincing people that government and politics 
will hold for them limited, if any, interest. 
Then, if people still felt obliged to inform themselves or to 
vote, they would at least not expect to be titillated, fascinated by 
the process. 
The same may be said for sex. 
Imagine the quantity of human suffering, frustration, and 
disappointment that could be relieved if it were announced with 
any degree of authority that sex, after all, had been discovered 
to be not necessarily interesting and, more to the point, that if 
one did not find great interest in sex, whether one enjoyed it 
or partook in sex a great deal, one need not consider oneself 
or one’s sexual relationships “dysfunctional,” nor need one seek 
psychological “treatment” for any “disorder.”  
Perhaps, someone will say, our sex lives and our democracy 
would suffer terribly if we followed this path. Perhaps sexual 
participation rates would drop, just as voter turnout rates would 
fall from fifty-five percent — already an unimpressive figure by 
any standard — to, say, twenty-five. Perhaps the pretense of in-
terest is somehow essential to retaining critical participation in 
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sex, politics, shopping, and the like, without which the society, 
the economy, and the species would suffer. 
I doubt it. Instead, I wonder if we might not take a step to-
ward confronting the truth about interest, toward recognizing 
how stuck we are in cycles of misinterest, boredom, and fasci-
nation, offering some chance to some daring few to break out 
of the unsatisfying rotations and compulsive repetitions of sex, 
politics, even daily life, itself. 
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A Dream of Guilt
 
My sister has killed herself and has left, beside her body, a “test” 
of some kind, in her bed, all bloody. 
It is a revealing test to be sure, a litmus test of sorts, but not a test 
of her. Rather, it is a test of us all, a test that will prove our guilt. 
My father is as nonchalant as could be. 
In fact, he is most concerned that I see a pillowcase on which 
has been written, in permanent marker, the following words, 
deemed to be of great importance and effectuating something 
of a double-bind: 
If Matthew comes home, throw this pillowcase away immedi-
ately. 
We are staying in a ritzy house in a tropical place whose name 
sounds like, but is nowhere near and nothing like, Saint Tropez. 
My mother wakes up hot and sweaty from the effort of sleeping. 




I have a close relationship of a romantic nature with a man who 
plays the xylophone beautifully. 
He and I are concerned that people will see us together without 
our clothes on. 
He empties the garbage cans musically, then returns to his xylo-
phone and plays, “I’ll be Your Mirror,” but, in doing so, makes it 
clear that the song is not intended for me.
Thus, as I say goodnight, I leave him a small charm, a silver ted-
dy bear, on the side table, for I will never see him again. 
The television in my room announces, cryptically: “‘Do Not In-
form’ is a penis cancer agent.” 
“Remember,” it cautions ominously, “D.N.I.P.C.A.”
“Do Not Inform” is, itself, a well-known psychiatric condition, 
as dangerous as penis cancer. 
“I have had both,” I say to myself; I thought I had fully recovered. 
Now, I cry out, to myself and others, “I have them again!” but 
no one hears.   
Instead, my mother sobs in the living room. 
I rush in to sympathize with her, but this time she responds with 
an accusation: “You have been terrible,” she says. 
Horrified at her suggestion — that my sister’s death is my fault 
— I fall silent. 
She mistakes my silence for the desire to officially change my 
name. 
77
a dream of guilt
My sister officially changed her name several times throughout 
her life. 
“Now I suppose you’ll change yours!” she spews with a glower. 
I cannot follow her logic, and yet I feel that what she says rings 
true. 
She lunges at me violently. 
I am shocked and scream but, oddly, I feel freer than before, 
because now I am face to face with my accuser. 
I begin to build up confidence but am repeatedly assaulted by 
terrible things: a phone call telling me my “timesheet is messed 
up,” a tax consultant informing me I owe $30,000, instructions 
from the intercom to climb the impossible staircase that is really 
a treadmill. 
Confused, I suddenly remark my wife’s books on the side table 
where, earlier, I had laid the teddy bear charm.  
At this moment, I realize that I am dreaming, and in spite of the 
nightmarish qualities of the dream, I decide to remain within it, 
or I dream that I make this decision, so that I can do whatever I 
please without consequence. 
My most immediate and overwhelming desire is to kiss some-
one, so I do. 
As I do, I pause for a moment, to reassure myself that the person 




Eros and Hatred in Three Groups
 
— Group 1 —
1.
I recently returned from serving as a Fulbright Specialist in ped-
agogy and curricular development in Singapore. My task was 
to assist a private university in their efforts to enhance critical 
thinking, creativity, reflectiveness, and autonomous questioning 
among students.
Part of my work including facilitating several lengthy work-
shops with faculty and student-tutors in which we discussed 
these outcomes, their meaning, and the many forces that can 
get in their way.
In several of these workshops, I devoted a considerable 
amount of time to the topic of group dynamics, since classes, 
study groups, peer-mentoring sessions, and even universities 
themselves all involve groups, and since group forces may exert 
tremendous power over group members, often to the detriment 
of critical thinking, creativity, reflectiveness, and autonomy.    
For portions of these workshops, I introduced a modified, 
highly abbreviated, and relatively benign version of the Tavis-
tock method of group study and experience known best via the 




The most basic yet most essential insight of this area of group 
psychology is that “groups” are more than bunches of individu-
als, and more than the collectivity they form. Once a group is 
formed, it takes on a psychic life of its own — fueled primarily 
by members’ externalized unconscious needs, desires, and fears. 
The banality “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” 
does not do this insight justice, for the group is both greater 
than and distinct from the “whole” that is greater than the sum 
of its constituent members. The group is or becomes a semi-
autonomous (i.e., influenced but not determined by any single 
individual, or even by all of the group members’ conscious wish-
es) force, which, in turn, acts upon group members individually 
and collectively. 
Large groups may possess a massive aspect — as in: an as-
pect of the “mass” — but even they are both more and less than a 
mass. The “face” of this group is not that of an individual, nor is 
it “ourselves, sounding ourselves,” at least not precisely. Instead, 
“There are not leaves enough to cover the face / it wears.” It gov-
erns us and then is “nowhere again, away and away.” It is “never 
the face / That hermit on reef sable would have seen, / Never the 
naked politician taught / By the wise,” only the face of the invis-
ible, colossal group (Stevens 1990, 206).  
I sometimes find myself imagining the group as a kind of 
cloud, in both a basic and more contemporary sense. The trick, 
when in groups, is to be aware that we sit amidst a cloud that 
contains powerful psychic charges, and to attempt to make 
that cloud — and its changing colors and tone and charges and 
movements and which is presently thundering, et cetera, et cet-
era. — more visible and comprehensible to group members.     
This aim, of facilitating awareness of the group — which is to 
say the “group-level” of experience — is the primary aim of the 
activities concerned with group-dynamics mentioned above. 
2.
In the modified version of the group activity I introduce, I in-
form group members of the nature and objectives of the activity 
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up front, I counsel them a bit about the theory of groups with 
which I am operating, and I warn them that I, as a group facili-
tator, will be attuned to the group level of experience — and not 
to individual group members or sub-groups — with the ultimate 
goal of drawing their attention to the group level of experience. 
This also means, I inform them, that I may behave somewhat 
differently than a traditional moderator of a discussion or leader 
of a workshop. I ask them to consider their primary “work task” 
to be to reflect upon and discuss what is happening at the group-
level experience in real time. I even write this “work task” on the 
board, for reasons that will become clear shortly. 
Then, I usually ask if everyone feels comfortable with the ac-
tivity or if any questions remain before starting. When all are 
ready, I say simply, “Okay, let’s begin.” 
Typically, as I fall silent, the group falls silent for several min-
utes as they try to figure out what to do in this unique situation. 
They may be trying to figure out how to organize themselves, 
how to speak to other group members, whether or not they re-
ally want to be a part of the group and its work, or whether they 
can tolerate the anxiety of being in an ambiguous and, to some 
degree, leaderless group. 
Frequently, the tension of silence is broken by an individual 
who asks, perhaps on behalf of or in service of the fledgling 
group, if I can re-explain everything about the activity: its work, 
its goal, and what members are “supposed to do.”
This presents an immediate challenge the group facilitator, 
who must decide what the question really expresses and how it 
relates to the life of the group. Some facilitators simply remain 
silent. I usually do not. 
Every group is different, but fairly commonly I find myself 
saying something like, “I wonder if this request for clarification 
on behalf of the group is actually something else entirely.”
You see, to do this work, although you are sincerely trying to 
help, you have to be willing to be a bit evasive, even, perhaps, a 
bit of an asshole, like a cross between a Yoda and that guidance 
counselor who thinks he is too smart to be a guidance counselor 
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and so tries to do psychotherapy with children when they only 
need some form to be signed.  
The response is not meant to be frustrating, but it is often 
taken to be so. After all, the objectives and nature of the activ-
ity were explained clearly and at length; the “work task” of the 
group is even written clearly on the board. 
The group, then, is not really asking for clarification but for 
something else. The group is using the voice of a willing mem-
ber to test the facilitator, to see to what degree it can become a 
dependent group: dependent upon the facilitator to do all the 
work for the group. 
Refusing to answer this question directly, then, is a way of 
telling the group that, as a facilitator, I am not going to col-
lude with their effort to make the group dependent upon me, 
although it may very well become a dependent group anyway. 
3.
The most extreme example of a dependent group I had ever 
encountered was the first group in Singapore with whom I in-
troduced this exercise. They did something I had never expe-
rienced before: They immediately disintegrated. It was as if an 
alarm bell had gone off. 
Within seconds of beginning, all group members pulled their 
chairs back from the circle, took out their mobile phones, and 
paired off into small groups of two or three, chatting about eve-
ryday things: gossip, news, breakfast, and the like.
This continued for twenty minutes with only one interrup-
tion: One group member shouted over the din, “This is great; 
can we do this all day?” at which group chuckled.
The immediate collapse of the group, as a group, was shock-
ing. My own experience was one of amazement, but also frustra-
tion, and, eventually, anger. 
The group had refused to be born, had refused, right from 
the start, to become a group. The only thing that group mem-
bers did together was to disband or abort the group, rejecting its 
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potentiality, never giving it a chance to be, never giving them-
selves or me a chance to experience it.
Eventually, when I became convinced that we would, indeed, 
“do this all day” absent any intervention from me, I somewhat 
reluctantly said: “I wonder why the group killed itself.” 
The response to this somewhat mysterious comment by 
group members was to all assert and concur that, absent clear 
directions from me, they could not do anything other than what 
they did. That is, their actions held no meaning and were the 
only, the natural, and the inevitable outcome of the activity. 
What is more, they did not understand the meaning of my 
statement, and they rejected the premise that there was or could 
have been a group to kill. They made it clear that they would 
continue to reject tasks that were ambiguous and unstructured, 
in large part because they saw in them no point or purpose. I 
had designed these tasks, in the view of the majority, to be de-
liberately frustrating, depriving, and withholding. 
While this group represents something near to one extremity 
of a disorganized and helplessly dependent group, a group that 
rejects even the work of becoming a group, the experience holds 
an insight into the accusation of withholding. 
4.
Quite often, group members will accuse group facilitators of 
withholding the assistance, the “answers,” or the support neces-
sary for the group to function. 
Such accusations contain considerable emotional valences: 
rage, sadness, terror, feelings of abandonment, and more.  
In a dyadic (one person to one person) psychotherapeutic 
encounter, an accusation that the analyst is withholding some-
thing from the patient may be interpreted as a manifestation of 
the transference, which means simply that the patient is trans-
ferring or projecting into the analyst’s silence the meanings, 
emotions, and understandings associated with another silence 
that resides at least partly in the patient’s unconscious. The pa-
tient has formed a schema or paradigm about silence, absence, 
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neglect, withholding, or deprivation that is activated by the ana-
lyst’s behavior and that arises in the psyche of the patient when 
the analyst’s behavior permits. 
What struck me about the group referred to above, and then 
about subsequent groups with which I interacted on this trip, 
was that the accusation of withholding may be more helpfully 
understood along different lines when dealing with groups. 
In these cases, the accusation of withholding seemed to be 
less a matter of projecting group members’ prior experiences or 
fantasies onto me or onto the group, and, more fundamentally, a 
matter of the projection the group’s own withholding behavior. 
That is, it was the group that was withholding itself from it-
self. It was group members who were refusing to share, to be a 
part of, or to contribute themselves to the group in ways that 
might have given the group something with which to work. 
In a different language, we might say that it was not I who was 
withholding the nourishment needed for the group to thrive but 
the group, itself. 
This insight, of course, even when I suggested it to the group 
in a way that the group could ingest, could not be recognized by 
the group. 
This method of understanding the meaning of the accusation 
of withholding resonates to some degree with Harry Guntrip’s 
notion of the “schizoid compromise” (1992), for group members 
split off and withhold valuable aspects of themselves from the 
group, while, at the same time, projecting onto the group disa-
vowed impulses and emotions. 
In many groups, a bargain is struck such that group activity 
will be, of necessity, empty, draining, and meaningless, even to 
the degree that the group experiences a good deal of anxiety 
about its own annihilation. This anxiety, then, seems to be more 
tolerable than the anxiety provoked by not withholding selves 
from the group in the ways called for by the group’s work. 
5.
Of course, we are all schizoid. 
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There is a healthy splitting and preservation of a part of the 
self, a part not available to others. 
Retaining a secret part or parts of the self, what Winnicott 
calls our “incommunicado” elements (1965, 187), is necessary if 
we wish to remain subjects, to assure contact with ourselves in 
difficult circumstances, and to exercise reflective autonomy and 
agency in groups.  
— Group 2 —
1.
At a recent panel discussion at the meeting of the Association 
for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, one participant 
made a comparison between the stigma associated with the 
slang term for mental illness, “crazy,” and the more powerful 
stigma of “the n-word.” 
In making her point, however, she did not say “the n-word,” 
but, rather, used the n-word.  
The group organized itself around this utterance. 
It took its new purpose to be that of sharing experiences of 
race-, gender-, sex-, and sexuality-oriented victimization. These 
were overwhelmingly the kinds of events that we now class, for 
better or for worse, as “micro-aggressions”: subtle verbal slights, 
ignorant and callous remarks. For example, a black person is 
questioned about the texture and style of her hair, or a person’s 
gender-identity is presumed based on physical appearance 
alone.     
Group members responded to these narratives with sym-
pathetic sighs and nodding, but also with wringing hands and 
winces, visible reactions of pain and even guilt, an important 
matter which I discuss below. In any case, the reactions of group 
members affirmed to the group that these experiences were im-
portant and painful. The utterance, in this sense, was the catalyst 
that gave the group a chance to form an identity and a belief-
system or ideology.  
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It did not appear that the participant who used the n-word 
meant it as an attack, although she later admitted that she knew 
it might be “provocative.” In such cases, one can often rightly 
assume that the individual is hoping (perhaps unconsciously) 
to draw the ire of the group or, at the very least, to ensure that 
her individual contribution becomes central to the group’s life 
and activity. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this participant was never attacked 
in a personal way by the group. If she succeeded in making her 
utterance central to the group’s short life, the group responded 
by making her continuing presence — including her later com-
ments and attempts at clarification — seem utterly irrelevant. 
The utterance allowed many group members to forge identi-
fications with those who suffer the racism, hatred, and degrada-
tion associated with and represented by the n-word. Through 
this identification with what might be called the (victim) “ego-
ideal” (see Freud 1959), group members bonded with each other. 
At the most patent level, the group found a way to change its 
function, which was initially to discuss an academic question 
having little or nothing to do with victimization. 
At a deeper level, the group found that it could achieve what 
all groups seek to achieve, an experience wherein members are 
submerged into a group that feels larger than life and is fantasied 
to be harmonious, perfect, and even, in some sense, immortal. 
This is the coming-together dynamic of groups, the group’s 
embrace of the group, which is not the same thing as the group’s 
embrace of its members, as a collectivity or as individuals. Let us 
call it the primary erotic activity of groups. 
2.
Erotic activity in groups defends against the fear of fragmenta-
tion or disintegration, a fear that has more than a whiff of early 
(infantile, childhood) loss. 
It may be understood as an attempt to recreate in the group 
what Winnicott refers to as a “holding environment” (1965), the 
earliest form of connection between infant and caregiver, where, 
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instead of bounded persons, relationships, and difference, there 
is unity, communion, and an experience of merger in which a 
corporate strength or power may be found. 
“There is no such thing as a baby,” Winnicott famously 
quipped (1992, 99); there is only a baby-caregiver dyad, fused 
together by Eros, among other things.  
A group’s erotic activity, then, is inseparable from its need to 
survive: Once “born,” the group does not want to “die.” 
At the same time, of course, individual group members do 
not want to “die” by being subsumed by or swallowed up by the 
group. The ambivalence — and, sometimes, outright contradic-
tion — between these dual ends and dual anxieties, constitutes a 
good deal of the psychic activity of groups. 
This means, of course, that the terms “erotic” and “Eros” 
must be read broadly and not strictly in line with the “Eros” of 
Plato, Sigmund Freud, Herbert Marcuse, or any other individual 
thinker. 
What is truly “erotic,” in the sense intended to describe the 
activity of this group and others, is not the sublimated sexual 
activity or fantasy life of the group — although this remains 
important — but the continuation of the life of the group, the 
consolidation of the group around basic assumptions, beliefs, 
and fantasies, and the formation of a group identity that offers 
a form of psychic support (if members align themselves with it 
adequately).  
In this particular group, members’ preoccupation with tell-
ing tales of victimization was both erotic and regressed: re-
gressed toward a paranoid stance in which the conflict between 
identifications with victim and victimizer was intensified. 
The aggression occasioned by this paranoid stance was only 
partly directed “outside.” That is, the participant who uttered the 
n-word was not “cast out,” nor did group members wish only to 
split up the world into those outside the group setting and those 
inside it. 
Rather, the tales of victimization told by group members 
elicited affective reactions — the hand-wringing and wincing 
described above — that expressed not only the fact that these 
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experiences cause victims to feel diminished to the extent that 
they accept and internalize the attribution implied by the words 
or actions of the victimizer. Rather, members simultaneously 
took on the guilt of the victimizer. 
To the extent that this interpretation is accurate —and it may 
not be — it would imply that the group’s activity was not split so 
simply as one might think, e.g., ‘The inside (the group) is good 
and the outside (the world) is bad.’
In a more complex way, members evinced hostility and ag-
gression toward members’ own inner victimizers, the parts of 
themselves identified with victimizers. 
The group was able to recognize that the “outside” was also 
inside, in the sense that members could not or did not wish to 
fully distance themselves from guilt for victimization. 
Perhaps the group felt that its activity would help excise these 
inner victimizers. But, of course, this kind of activity is, itself, 
victimizing. 
That is, the parts of ourselves that identify with victimiz-
ers — which is to say: that see ourselves in them, and see them in 
ourselves — cannot be gotten rid of so easily, mainly because of 
the obvious paradox: Attempts to destroy our victimizer-selves 
are acts of victimization themselves, as parts of ourselves come 
under attack. Thus, when we attack our victimizer-selves we are, 
at the same time, identified with and acting on behalf of our 
victimizer-selves. Therefore, we are expressing erotic impulses 
toward the parts of ourselves identified with victimizers, and 
these, too, become part of the psychic life of the individual or 
the group. 
3.
After being patient for a long time, a senior member of the As-
sociation was given the chance to speak and managed to get out 
only eight words (“I teach at a large state university and —”) be-
fore being interrupted by several others who informed him that 
he was derailing the group’s activity. 
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These persons, including the group’s leaders, reminded him 
of the need to “stay with what was happening” in the group. 
This individual spoke in a calm voice with little emotion. 
If it was inferred from his affect that he would not “stay with” 
the group’s primary activity, it was because it was clear that he 
was not likely to testify to an experience of victimization. 
Worse, he was going to offer a thought. 
The majority of group members, at that moment, did not 
want to depart from the activity of testifying about victimiza-
tion and certainly did not wish to think, for several reasons, 
the most important of which is the possibility that his thought 
would have called the group’s attention to the fact that they were 
speaking about discrimination and victimization, but were re-
ally interested in exploring ways to identify with their victim-
izer-selves. 
Testimonials of being victimized were covers for a different 
sort of activity: the group’s coming together as a group of vic-
tims who victimized each other’s inner victimizers. 
4.
It seems worth pointing out that, at the beginning of this group’s 
time together, a short speech was given about fluidity in sex- 
and gender-identity and, in what has become a familiar practice, 
all members of the group were told to state our names, followed 
by our preferred pronouns: 
Hi, I’m Matt: He, Him, His. 
Hi, I’m Zelda: They, Them, Their. 
Hi, I’m Ty: Ze, Zir, Zirs.
While understandable, this exercise strikes me as a very unfor-
tunate way to begin group conversations. 
The breathless conjunction of names with strings of pro-
nouns makes it difficult to recall anyone’s proper name, much 
less each person’s preferred pronouns. So, after this exercise has 
been completed, group members may have succeeded in reveal-
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ing aspects of their individual identities to the group, but, ulti-
mately, have partaken in a group ritual that may hold deleteri-
ous consequences for productive group work. 
As might be expected, group members quickly forgot how 
to address each other, and, thus, the conversation became more 
abstract, passive, and fearful than necessary, as in: 
Something said a few minutes ago by, erm — sorry I forget 
your name — in response to the earlier, um, comment made 
by — made a few minutes ago on the topic of structural vio-
lence, was —interesting, in my opinion.
Perhaps this blockage of communication was, or is, an uncon-
scious goal.    
It is also possible, if not likely, that not all members of all 
groups wish to announce the pronouns associated with their 
sex- or gender-identities, whether they are consciously aware of 
their aversion or not. 
The idea driving the practice of announcing pronouns is, of 
course, that having one’s sex- or gender-identity mistaken can 
be painful. The practice is intended to prevent this. 
But beneath the fear of being mistaken lies a conviction that 
announcing one’s preferred pronouns cannot or should not be 
painful, or, at least, that it is less painful than being mistaken. 
Put another way, the activity suggests that, even if someone 
may wish to abstain — for whatever reason — from announc-
ing his/her/their/zirs pronouns, no one should wish to abstain 
from the ritual because the ritual, itself, is fantasized to possess 
magical properties by which shame is transformed into pride. 
By enforcing this ritual (quite undemocratically), the group in-
sists that members should be proud of their sex- and gender-
identities. 
A desire not to announce one’s pronouns to a group would 
be understood by the group as a betrayal, in both senses of the 
word: 
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1. betrayal as contravention of a group norm, in this case, the 
norm of showing pride, even if the person does not actually 
feel pride, and 
2. betrayal as revelation of the individual’s emotional and intel-
lectual reality and presence as an individual, perhaps with 
complex and ambivalent feelings about his/her/their/zirs 
own sex and gender identity, and not merely as a member of 
a group that insists on performances of pride. 
Not to pronounce one’s pronouns betrays the group because ab-
stention introduces doubt, not only about the strength of the 
ties that bind group members together — including their beliefs, 
their dedication to their rituals, their fantasies of abandonment 
of individuality for the group, et cetera — but about the core 
conviction that the group is capable of mobilizing aggression to 
protect members from shame.  
5.
Many people struggle mightily with their sexes, genders, and 
sexualities. Many queer persons face enormous challenges in 
societies and cultures where cis-gender identity and heterosex-
uality are still the norms, where “deviations” from these norms 
are stigmatized, and where such stigmatizations are internalized 
in the form of shame. 
Yet, there are different methods that we can employ in the 
struggle against shame. Insisting that, instead of shame, we feel 
pride, is one. There is no need to feel pride about one’s sex, gen-
der, race, or sexuality, for instance, unless there is, first, shame, 
or the possibility of shame. 
In pronouncing pronouns, people announce their pride and 
insist that others do so as well, regardless of whether that pride 
is genuine or, beneath the active performance of pride, there is a 
reservoir of shame that must not be acknowledged. 
This reservoir of shame is projected into the group, and is 
related to ambivalently: It is both depended upon and attacked. 
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Shame is inextricably linked to the part of the self that iden-
tifies with the victimizing other. To attempt to eliminate shame 
from members of a group is to supplant internal defenses 
against victimization (identification with the aggressor) with 
group-based defenses (identification with the group, which may 
be aggressive, itself). 
Thus, the bargain is this: The group will provide members 
with identity-support and will protect members to some degree 
from experiences of shame, so long as the member attacks those 
aspects of his/her/their/zirs individual identities that do not ac-
cord with the group’s basic beliefs, fantasies, and assumptions. 
The connection, then, between the preliminary activity of 
pronouncing pronouns and the later erotic/aggressive activ-
ity of the group is this: The group was “born” in a ritual whose 
emotional meaning was: “All group members must be on guard 
against their own feelings of shame, which is to say: against their 
own internal victimizers. But, at the same time, we must bring 
to the group our shame, in the form of pronouncing pronouns 
of pride, and as a part of the narratives of victimization and their 
impacts, so that shame can be attacked.”
Put another way, the group decided that it could and should 
victimize the victimizers, both within and without. 
In sum, the group did not regress because of an outside threat, 
represented by one member’s use of the n-word or the possibil-
ity of a group member misgendering another. Rather, the group 
seized opportunities to victimize itself, in a manner of speaking, 
in a forum where group members would not have to become 
aware of this activity. 
— Group 3 —
1.
Each year, I teach an advanced seminar in psychoanalytic po-
litical theory. The course examines hatred, among other things, 
as a central dynamic in the life of families, organizations, and 
groups. 
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The participants in the seminar reflect upon our own group 
experience — our own thoughts, feelings, and experiences as 
they arise in the group — as part of our work. 
This “group encounter” aspect of the course demands that 
my role as professor include some of the work of a psychody-
namically-sensitive “group facilitator,” and that students, too, 
become conscious of their dual roles as students and as group 
members. 
There is a particular kind of “Eros” running through any col-
lege class, even more so for a course on a subject of emotional 
intensity. The desire — shared by professors and students — to 
“love” the course and to “love” one another is always there. 
In this case, the class was already close-knit, comprising 
eighteen students who had enrolled in an undergraduate “learn-
ing community,” and who had taken a number of courses to-
gether for the past three and a half years.
The course group had already reached certain conclusions 
about hatred, conclusions which I believed to be reasonably 
well-founded. For instance, we had spent some time reflecting 
upon the way hatred can be used to distance the self from inter-
nal bad (hated) objects. 
We had arrived at a shared understanding of the need for 
hated objects, too, since, if we, following Otto Kernberg, associ-
ate hatred with rage, then by taking on the badness of our rage, 
hated objects permit us to experience our rage without experi-
encing our hatred and, therefore, without experiencing shame 
or guilt. 
Likewise, we had come to a tenuous agreement regarding the 
transformative nature of hatred and the way that it often be-
hooves the hating person or group to transform an object into 
something more, not less, hateful, so that the hatred already felt 
is better justified. 
2.
Rather late in the semester — which, until then, had proceeded 
more or less uneventfully — a student announced abruptly: 
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I really hate the kids in my classes. 
It was an odd statement, and not germane to our discussion. 
It was also quite clear, from her body language, her gaze, and 
the direction in which she spoke, that she was not talking about 
“her classes” in an abstract or general sense but was, in fact, re-
ferring to a particular and identifiable sub-group of students in 
our class. 
The students to whom she referred were present at the time, 
although they were not paying attention to her: an important 
dynamic that likely contributed to her feelings of hatred. 
The student continued: 
Sometimes people are just so stupid. I hate stupid people. So, I 
guess I am like a Nazi or something?  
This student’s announcement of her hatred, combined with the 
complex question of whether her hatred made her bad and hate-
ful — which was at least part of the emotional meaning of “like a 
Nazi”— proved challenging for me and for the group. 
Nearly all group members were aware that the comment was 
directed at a small number of readily identifiable members of 
the group. Some squirmed in discomfort. 
The student was saying that she hated those students right 
there, and not just a little. She “really” hated them, perhaps in 
the way Nazis “really” hated Jews, homosexuals, Roma, and oth-
ers. 
She was also saying that she really hated the group, as a 
whole, and that she really hated me, as the group’s facilitator, for 
causing her or permitting her to feel hatred and, what is worse, 
for putatively suggesting to her that she should feel “like a Nazi” 
for harboring hatred. 
3.
My sense was that the student’s comment was intended to ac-
complish several things at once. 
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First, and most obviously, she wished to vent hateful feelings 
toward a certain sub-group of students in the class, students 
who often derailed our progress with off-hand comments, noise, 
laughter, and other disruptions. These students also seemed to 
make other group members feel frustrated at not being attended 
to or heard. 
This student also wished to push the limits of the group and 
to test my limits as a facilitator. She wished to see if we could 
tolerate an explicit announcement of hatred in a course in part 
about hatred, or if we would shut down the dialogue, mobilize 
aggression (and potentially hatred) against her, and collapse the 
openness that had thus far characterized our discussions. 
I believe she knew we would not retaliate in this way, that 
it was “safe,” at least in one sense, for her to announce her ha-
tred. That is, it would have been extremely unlikely for anyone 
to have answered the student’s rhetorical question about being 
like a Nazi in the affirmative — which I confess to having had 
the urge to do — by saying, for instance: “Yes, your hatred makes 
you like a Nazi.” In some way, it did. 
At the time of her comment, the sub-group of unruly stu-
dents were again talking among themselves, not paying enough 
attention to her to notice that they were being named as hated 
objects, which, of course, only confirmed their hateful aspect in 
the eyes of some group members. 
The behavior of the sub-group therefore was a predictable 
and convenient evidentiary hearing, by which the student was 
able to offer proof that her hatred was justified. This dynamic is 
by no means unknown to those who study victimization: The 
victimized persons, caught or recalled in the very act of being 
victimized, are seen in moments of degradation or diminish-
ment, and are then regarded as degraded or diminished persons, 
unworthy of care and deserving only of further victimization.
What I found most fascinating was that the student’s an-
nouncement of hatred had an impact on all members of the 
group except for the sub-group at which it was aimed, which 
might be said in another way: She instilled in others something 
of her experience, recruiting the majority of group members 
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against the sub-group and asking them to share with her the 
burden of her hatred while in the presence of the hated sub-
group. 
It would not be at all surprising to me if this result was in-
tended by the student: that her comment, appropriately timed, 
would coalesce the majority of the group around her hate.   
Rejecting many of the complexities and conclusions reached 
in the course-group, the student offered a proposal, a kind of 
bargain, to the group: 
If what we have learned is right, then my feelings of hatred 
mean I hate myself. But I am not like a Nazi, so I should not 
hate myself. Since I should not hate myself, I refuse to accept 
responsibility for my hatred. And yet I still hate. You can join 
me in my hatred and, since you are no more Nazis than I, you, 
too, will not have to experience yourselves as hateful, which 
means you, too, will not be forced to confront the hatred within 
yourselves. The idea that we could be involved with anything 
here, in this group, that resembles Nazis is absurd. 
She was asking, then, for support in identifying with her victim-
izer-self and to be able to survive this identification emotion-
ally, both as an individual and as a group member. These are 
not unhealthy or unreasonable things to ask. And yet, she was 
asking, in an aggressive way, something that the group could not 
provide, even if they had tried: that the group make her feelings 
of hatred tolerable to herself. 
4.
After she spoke, I felt it was necessary to let the group contem-
plate what had happened. I, too, needed time to think about it, 
so I remained silent for several moments. 
The extremity of her simile — “like a Nazi” — suggested that, 
for her, the emotional tension produced in the group was con-
siderable. The group had put her on the “wrong” side, the Nazi 
side, and she needed to get herself back to the “right” side. 
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She used the group, and the sub-group of students, then, 
to reject much of the substance of the course and to place an 
emotional burden — virtually an ultimatum — on the group as a 
whole, which was the burden of reconciling her own emotional 
dilemma. The group had made her feel shame for feeling hate, 
even though we had explicitly discussed the reality of hate and 
had tried to establish an environment in which hate could be 
recognized and dealt with maturely, as it is always a potential for 
persons and groups. 
To the extent that she was seeking absolution for her hatred, 
I could not provide it, mainly because that would lie beyond 
the boundaries of my roles as facilitator and professor. Like-
wise, the group did not defend or console her. Perhaps this was 
because such a request for absolution, if indeed there was one, 
was framed in such a way that in order to grant it, we would 
have had to become complicit in her hatred and in her implicitly 
hateful denouncement of the group and of our work together. 
It may be that the student who announced her hatred did 
so because the alternative was for her to feel fractured, disin-
tegrated, or annihilated, or for her to fracture, disintegrate, or 
annihilate the group in some other, less reparable, and more ter-
rifying way — terrifying, at least, in her imagination and fantasy. 
In any case, the student’s announcement returns us to the 
idea of using aggression to defend against shame. 
Consider the similarities between group members who 
withhold themselves from groups only to aggressively accuse 
the group or its facilitator of withholding and depriving them, 
persons who utter the n-word at academic conferences or oth-
erwise aim to “provoke” the group, and split off and hated sub-
group of students in a college course. 
While these persons and groups disrupt the group’s real 
work, they behave as if it is their function to sustain group life, 
without which there would be no group at all. They take their 
task to be a survival task, one of barely being. They provide reli-
able backstops against utter aimlessness, chaos, or group dis-
solution in the sense that the group can always turn to them 
to organize its activity around aggression or hate. In this sense, 
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hate contributes, in a primitive but perhaps underappreciated 
way, to the erotic life of the group. 
5.
Of course, as both a group member and the group’s facilitator, I 
had to consider the student’s comment in the context of my own 
feelings about her and about the group, which is a matter akin 
to analyzing the countertransference in psychoanalysis and is, 
unfortunately, too complex to examine at length here. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that, in spite of a very difficult 
moment of hatred announced, and in spite of the fact that we 
could have very well devolved into extreme conflict, the group 
remained together and even remained, in some important 
sense, unchanged. 
If I am honest, I believe this lack of change was a source of 
relief for me, since, at the time, it seemed to me that the group’s 
emotional survival was being held in the balance. 
My feelings of relief may very well make me complicit with 
conservative and regressive forces in the group, such as the de-
sire not to change, not to learn, and not to grow from new ex-
perience.  
Perhaps predictably, while I was contemplating this, laughter 
and irrelevant chatter from the disruptive sub-group of students 
distracted me and the rest of the students until our time was up.
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A Dream of Teaching
 
A student from a course taught several years ago approaches me 
on a Manhattan street with an essay in hand. 
She has an excuse for not turning in the essay on time. 
Her excuse is “memory loss from Lupus.” 
But, she explains, she did not want to say this out loud in class, 
and so she is only bringing it up now, years later, in private. 
May she still turn in her essay? 
“Yes, of course,” I say. 
And then I feel the strong impulse to add:
“You can always tell me — but of course you do not have to tell 
me — about how you are feeling.” 
Suddenly, her eyes change. 
She suspects something about this statement and her doubt re-
bounds upon me in such a way that I, too, question its motive 
and its sincerity. 
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She says, forcefully: “You are bullshit.” 
I reply: “You are bullshit.” 
As we part, I have a warm, comforting feeling that, in spite of 






The question, “How civilized are we?” holds several meanings. 
One meaning is: “Where can we direct our hatred?” 
If we declare ourselves “uncivilized,” we can hate human na-
ture. Or, since all of us began as rather uncivilized creatures, we 
can hate the children we once were. 
If we are “civilized,” but anxious and depressed because of it, 
we can hate society and authority for making us so. 
That is, if we are seeking suitable containers for hatred and 
self-hatred, then the only intolerable answer to the question of 
our degree of civilization would be: “The world is very civilized 
and everyone is thoroughly content.” 
Albeit a pleasant thought, this statement is not true. And if 
it were, it would seriously complicate our ability to manage our 
“uncivilized” emotions and impulses. 
The noun “civilization” comes to us from the French Enlight-
enment (civilisation), after the verb “to civilize” had arisen from 
the adjective “civil.” In this way, the very concept of “civilization” 
is inextricable from the “civilizing” projects of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
Whether expressed in the domain of education, government, 
culture, or imperial/colonial conquest, the idea of civilization 
relies on a belief in a (real or potential) human condition of “be-
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ing civil” that is opposed to a (real or potential) human condi-
tion of “being savage.” 
The violence inherent in such a splitting of human possibili-
ties is related to the violence that results from efforts to “civi-
lize” ourselves and others, and from our own violent reactions 
to such efforts. 
2.
Complex questions about civilization require that we examine 
not merely physical violence, physical health, and physical se-
curity, but hidden violence, psychic unhealth, and ontological 
insecurity. 
One way to do so is to define “civilization” as the conversion 
of physical violence and overt domination into structural, invis-
ible, and internalized violence and self-violence. 
Many thoughtful critics of modernity, from Karl Marx to 
Friedrich Nietzsche to Sigmund Freud to Michel Foucault, have 
expounded this thesis, yet one of its most memorable depictions 
remains Kafka’s “A Report to an Academy,” in which the main 
character, Rotpeter the ape, describes his miraculous transfor-
mation into a human being, thus: 
I learned things, gentlemen. Ah, one learns things when one 
has to; one learns when one needs a way out; one learns at all 
costs. One stands over oneself with a whip; one flays oneself 
at the slightest opposition. (1971, 258) 
The self-violence at the heart of Rotpeter’s project of self-civ-
ilization, and the analogy drawn between the training of an 
ape, the education of a child, and the assimilation of a creature 
into human culture and civilization, all suggest a fruitful line of 
questioning: 
What does it really mean to be civil? 




Here, we must approach “civil being” as something much 
more meaningful than mere “politeness.” Rather, civil being 
includes that central norm of inter-subjective ethics and the 
governing principle of object-relations: “Being civil” depends, 
first, on an individual’s being, and, second, on his or her abil-
ity to treat others as separate beings, which entails preserving 
boundaries and relating with others across those boundaries in 
authentic and meaningful ways. 
3.
Rotpeter the ape discovers, in captivity and amidst torture and 
terror, that he is able to mimic the behavior, speech, and thought 
of the humans who have imprisoned him, but, like many of 
Kafka’s characters, Rotpeter lacks the ability to be, to act, and 
to relate civilly. 
Rotpeter’s identification with his captors is the only “way out” 
of his cage (253), but it is also only a “way out”: nothing more.  
His civilization is coerced assimilation: a process by which 
he repudiates in himself all that is not identical to those around 
him. Having internalized the demands of his tormentors, Rot-
peter ultimately thanks his “teachers” for helping him to break 
his authentic nature, for “fighting on the same side against the 
nature of apes” (257). 
Rotpeter’s civilizers train him to smoke a pipe and drink 
schnapps, but they do not help him develop a self that is capable 
of being on its own, or of interacting with others in meaningful 
ways. 
Indeed, Rotpeter is like a human but incapable of being hu-
man, for he is incapable of acting spontaneously in the world, 
or of communicating with others, or of challenging the world 
around him without fearing a return to his dreadful cage. That 
his “civilization” was founded upon fear, pain, torment, and im-
prisonment means that the specter of these horrors haunts his 
thoughts and deeds, keeping him “human” in a superficial sense 
but undermining any true humanity he might achieve. 
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In the end, Rotpeter feels compelled to cover up even his own 
story of transformation by declaring that his words contain no 
communicative content, no emotion, no meaning: “I am only 
imparting knowledge, I am only making a report. To you, also, 
honored Members of the Academy, I have only made a report” 
(259). 
Rotpeter’s missed, failed, or empty civilization thus asks us 
to reflect upon the fear, pain, and torment motivating our own. 
If civilizing practices, such as child-rearing, education, and 
more, are carried out by those who, themselves, fear a cage — a 
cage of failure, a cage of shame, a cage of depression — then 
these practices cannot facilitate the development of autono-
mous, authentic human beings. 
If we must be civilized or else, then our eventual identifica-
tion with our “civilizers” (and with their violence and self-vio-
lence) will be all that protects us from experiencing ourselves as 
“savage,” abhorrent, worthless. 
4.
The violence, therefore, that informs the split between “civilized” 
and “savage” is transmitted via civilizing individuals, families, 
groups, organizations, and institutions, and is unleashed upon 
the “uncivilized” aspects of ourselves and others in the name of 
progress. 
This aspect of our civilization is too often ignored and de-
fended by our manic, if not compulsive, attention to visible 
signs of “progress” in civilization: technological change, eco-
nomic growth, physical or material change, and the like.
To the extent that our civilizing practices depend upon 
shared (self-)hatred of the uncivilized, they make civil being 
impossible, not only because they undercut an individual’s au-
thentic being — which must learn to tolerate and integrate the 
uncivilized aspects of the self — but because individuals who are 




That is, persons civilized in such a way can only identify with 
those who hate their selves. Those who do not hate their selves 
are suspected to be outsiders, strangers, naïvely “sovereign sub-








In German, “Was ist los?” [literally: “What is loose?”] is a greet-
ing, akin to, “What’s going on?” but with a slightly negative con-
notation, as in, “What is the matter?”
Every German-speaking person has likely heard the reply, 
“Der Hund ist los” [literally: “The dog is loose”], or some varia-
tion thereof: “Der Hund ist los and und die Katze ist in der Keller” 
[“The dog is loose and the cat is in the cellar”]. 
A greeting in the form of a question is here met not with an 
answer but with reply, a reply that is a joke, and a joke that is, 
frankly, a bad joke. 
If it is difficult to imagine anything valuable arising from 
such trivialities, consider the fact that “What is loose?” also sug-
gests, ‘“What is lost?” to which a jocular reply, while communi-
cating little in manifest content, may express the need to deflect 
the question. 
On the other hand, if one were to ask a dog, “Was ist los?” and 
the dog were to respond, “Der Hund ist los,” the question would 




In Kafka’s difficult story, “Forschungen eines Hundes” [“Investi-
gations of a Dog”], the eponymous yet unnamed narrator (who 
is a dog, himself) tells us that all dogs “live together in a literal 
heap,” that “nothing can prevent us from satisfying that commu-
nal impulse,” and that “all our laws and institutions […] go back 
to this longing for the greatest bliss we are capable of, the warm 
comfort of being together” (1971, 279).  
Thus, when, in his youth, our dog spies seven dogs who 
dance, stand on their hind legs (“uncovering their nakedness”), 
and make an incredible music without voices — thereby sug-
gesting that “Nature were an error” (284) — he objects to their 
seemingly willful violation of both the letter and the spirit of 
dog law. 
He demands to know what they are doing. (Perhaps he might 
have asked them, “Was ist los!?”) 
But, to his question, “they — incredible! incredible! They 
never replied, behaved, as if [he] were not there” (283).  
Replying to other dogs is “unconditionally command[ed]” 
by dog law, so their failure to reply is yet another offense against 
the law that all dogs behave in such a way as to affirm every dog’s 
membership in “the canine community” (278). 
Our dog’s attempts to question the seven dogs, perhaps even 
to correct them, are in vain, for the seven dogs reply only by 
continuing their obscenities. 
They make a mockery of dogdom, even though they do not 
do so joyfully. Instead, it seemed as if they danced and made 
music under compulsion, “quiver[ing] at every step with a per-
petual apprehension, as if rigid with despair” (283). 
Our dog admits that it is possible that he was deluded, con-
fused, or mistaken in his vision: that he witnessed no such event. 
But he is not deterred by doubt from his subsequent investiga-
tions. 
Instead, this “concert” becomes the foundation of his inquir-
ies into the mysteries of dog existence. 
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He begins, like an adolescent might, by making “accusations 
and investigations,” trying “to drag others to the place where all 
this had happened […] to show everybody where I had stood 
and the seven had stood, and where and how they had danced 
and made their music” (285). 
These activities, he later admits, “robbed me of a great part 
of my childhood” (286) and inaugurated his ill-fated study, for 
which — he reminds the reader several times — he is inadequate, 
unprepared by formal training.
So, our dog turns his attention to a different but not unrelat-
ed subject: the greatest mystery of dogdom, upon which count-
less essays have been published and circulated among the dog 
community: the question of “what the canine race nourishe[s] 
itself upon.” 
The answer to this question is given to every dog in infancy 
in the form of a single imperative to “water the ground as much 
as you can,” for it is well known that the watering of the ground, 
in addition to the performance of “certain spells, songs, and 
ritual movements” procures dogs’ nourishment from the earth 
(286–87).   
But if one inquires further, if one asks, for example, “But 
where does the earth procure the food which it gives to dogs,” 
no answer can or will be given. 
To ask such a question is to elicit only a reply, such as, “If 
you haven’t enough to eat, we’ll give you some of ours,” which is 
not only untrue, since dogs are not known for sharing food, but 
tangential at best, to the matter at hand. 
For our dog, such a response is not even a reply but a bad 
joke, a “jest,” a form of “raillery” (288), not unlike, “Der Hund 
ist los.” 
This sort of jest is but one way in which our dog feels that 
other dogs seek to divert him from his quest. If other dogs have 
occasionally shared their food with him, it was merely in order 




While, at first, our dog was certain that others were attempt-
ing to seduce him into complacency, eventually, he hit upon an 
insight into his own activity. “I was the one,” he confesses, “who 
was trying to seduce the others, and […] I was actually success-
ful up to a certain point,” for  
only with the assistance of the whole dog world could I begin 
to understand my own questions. […] It is not merely flesh 
and blood that we have in common, but knowledge also, and 
not only knowledge, but the key to it as well. I do not possess 
that except in common with all the others; I cannot grasp it 
without their help. The hardest bones, containing the richest 
marrow, can be conquered only by a united crunching of the 
teeth of all dogs. (289–91) 
Indeed, our dog admits that all along he has wanted to use the 
dog community to help him gather knowledge, which he would 
hoard greedily, although it would ultimately sicken him:
I want to compel all dogs thus to assemble together, I want 
the bones to crack open under the pressure of their collec-
tive preparedness, and then I want to dismiss them to the 
ordinary life that they love, while all by myself, quite alone, 
I lap up the marrow. That sounds monstrous, almost as if I 
wanted to feed on the marrow, not merely of a bone, but of 
the whole canine race itself. But it is only a metaphor. The 
marrow that I am discussing here is no food; on the contrary, 
it is a poison. (291)  
So, our dog needs the dog community to find answers to his 
questions, questions which the dog community does not, itself, 
seem capable of answering and which, we may surmise, should 
they be answered, would spell the end of “the ordinary life” of 
dogs. 
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Our dog, then, wishes to be alone in drinking the marrow 
of knowledge, which is also a poison: the poison that will kill 
the dog (and/or the doggishness, and/or the doggedness) within 
him. 
He acknowledges that his “questions only serve as a goad to 
myself; I only want to be stimulated by the silence which rises 
up around me as the ultimate answer. How long will you be able 
to endure the fact that the world of dogs […] is pledged to si-
lence and always will be?” (291). 
And yet he too is a “bulwark of silence.” He, too, has “the 
impulse to question and the impulse not to answer” (293). Thus, 
“all this ceaseless labor — to what end? Merely to entomb one-
self deeper and deeper in silence, it seems, so deep that one can 
never be dragged out of it again by anybody” (299). 
4.
It is hard not to remark the resemblances between the shocking 
concert our dog witnesses and a kind of traumatizing, Freudian 
“primal scene,” just as it is hard to ignore the themes of food, 
hunger, and fasting that run throughout the story. But none of 
these themes brings us much closer to understanding the story’s 
meaning. Worse, they may be distractions. 
The extensive literary commentary on the story — rife with 
discussions of sex and food (see, e.g., Williams 2007) — may 
only demonstrate that we cannot help ourselves but to return 
and return, to be both bored and fascinated, like dogs, by these 
subjects.  
It is true that our dog undertakes a lengthy fast as an experi-
ment to discover the source of dogs’ nourishment. And it is true 
that fasting is contrary to the laws of dogdom as well as to the 
most fundamental of a dog’s instincts. 
But what our dog is after is an ultimate understanding that he 
cannot conceive. The inconceivable, then, is the real foundation 
of his inquiries. Put another way, he is motivated by and fasci-
nated by that which he cannot imagine. 
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Primal scenes of singing dogs and lengthy fasts unto deliri-
um are but stand-ins, as it were, for the impossible understand-
ing he wishes to possess. 
5.
Here, then, are the real conundrums: 
Our dog hates silence, but admits that silence is his ultimate 
goal. 
The dog community is pledged to silence, and yet they are 
forbidden to be silent. 
In fact, the dog community constantly asks questions, and 
constantly replies to each other’s greetings, but only to drown 
out and “obliterate the trace of genuine questions” (297). 
Dogs are naturally groupish, drawn to live together, and even 
our dog admits that his goal, much of the time, is easily achieved 
with a howl or a bite: “amiable attention, friendly contiguity, 
honest acceptance, ardent embraces, barks that mingle as one: 
everything is directed toward achieving an ecstasy, a forgetting 
and finding again” (290). And yet the seven dogs are different, 
and witnessing their difference marks our dog as different, sepa-
rate, exiled. 
These (apparent) contradictions suggest that we ask: What 
does our dog mean by “a forgetting and a finding again”? 
Does he mean that to ask impossible questions is to seek not 
answers but replies, a series of replies, even an assurance of nev-
er-ending replies? 
A reply is not as satisfying as an answer, but a reply may be 
given again and again, whereas an answer, presumably, need be 
given only once. 
Consider, on this point, the chatter of Vladimir and Estragon 
in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot (1956). The often comic, 
often tragic absurdity of their speech, its madness even, may be 
applied according to a certain method: It assures endless, al-
though confounding, conversation. 
It ensures contact and togetherness, but not communication 
and relatedness. Indeed, it assures the absence and poverty of 
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communication, for fear that genuine communication and re-
latedness might destroy the security of a more primitive contact 
and togetherness. 
Or consider the case of Job, who receives, at best, a tangen-
tial reply, but not an answer, to his interrogations of God. God 
speaks to Job out of the whirlwind with no real regard for Job’s 
inquiries, complaints, and protestations. God declares His su-
preme majesty and power. He overwhelms Job in His reply. 
It is difficult to know whether Job is satisfied by this. Perhaps 
God’s reply resounds in Job’s ears until the day Job dies. Per-
haps this continued “presence” of God — even a different and 
diminished God — is better, in some sense, than an answer to 
the question: “Why did the God Job thought he knew betray 
Job, permitting all that Job loved to be destroyed?” 
What if mysteries exist so that we always have something 
about which to cry out, as if we were seeking answers when, 
in fact, we seek only endless and repetitive (and perhaps even 
insubstantial or boring or meaningless) replies? 
What if, even more than we need answers, we need replies to 
assure us that we are not alone in silence? 
What if silence, itself, is not categorically distinct from a re-
ply but is, in essence, a reply that carries a kind of meaning? It is, 
after all, in a kind of silence that we, as children, first encounter 
the idea: “not good enough,” i.e., “I am not good enough to de-
serve the response from the other that I most desire.” 
What if it is, then, upon the reply that is contained in silence 
that we construct a psychic shrine to missing words, missing 
touches, missing persons, and other mysteries: an invisible tem-
ple, and a poor substitute for a home. 
6.
Our dog (ambivalently) wishes to be alone, and is encouraged in 
this quest by at least three examples of dogs who have achieved a 
definitive separation from the canine community: (1) the seven 
dog musicians, (2) the “soaring dogs” (294), who have never 
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been seen but of whom many credible accounts have been giv-
en, and (3) the ancient or original dogs.  
Soaring dogs are, to our dog, an outrage, for they are very 
small and let their legs “fall into desuetude.” Worse, they “reap 
without having sowed,” since they do not “water the ground” or 
contribute to the collective life of dogs in any way but still gather 
nourishment from the earth, only to return to their “senseless 
occupation” of floating in the air (294). 
Since they are literally set above other dogs, they are imag-
ined to hold a “higher” knowledge and, indeed, “are perpetually 
talking, partly of their philosophical reflections, with which […] 
they can continuously occupy themselves, partly of the obser-
vations they have made form their exalted stations” (295). But 
their philosophies are worthless and, according to our dog, in 
reality, contribute nothing to dogdom. 
The ancient or original dogs, about whom we can only con-
jecture, brought the dog community together but, in doing so, 
lost “the Word” and condemned all dogs to an ignorance and a 
silence about that which was most sacred. 
No one knows, of course, what “the Word” is or was, but it is 
imagined by our dog not to be a set of laws but as a divine pres-
ence, much as John (1:1–2, KJV) famously begins his gospel: “In 
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God.”
Their fates less determined by habit, custom, and community 
life, the early generations of dogs had the opportunity to seize 
upon “the Word” but failed. “The edifice of dogdom was still 
loosely put together, the true Word could still have intervened, 
planning or replanning the structure, changing it at will, trans-
forming it into its opposite,” just as “the Word was there, was 
very near at least, on the tip of everyone’s tongue, anyone might 
have hit upon it” (Kafka 1971, 300). 
In the beginning, the ancient dogs were closer to “the Word.” 
It was therefore “easier to get them to speak out,” “even if no-
body actually succeeded in doing that” (299), but the ancients 
“strayed” (got lost, got loose [los]), not knowing their “their ab-
erration was to be an endless one” (300), and began to enjoy 
115
der hund ist los
“dog life,” which is a life without the possibility of uttering or 
hearing the true Word, without the possibility of answering the 
ultimate questions.
The ancient dogs committed the canine version of original 
sin. They left behind that which was divine in order to become 
“doggish” (300), to enjoy ordinary life. 
Now, the Word is lost and can never be found. This is not the 
fault of the current, “fallen” generation of dogs. For them, the 
Word is but “the thousandth forgetting of a dream forgotten one 
thousand times” (300), which is why it is possible to say that a 
dream forgotten a thousand times has an exquisite quality. 
7.
In this story, then, we are presented with at least two kinds of 
silence and at least two kinds of guilt.
There is, first, the silence of the ancient dogs, who strayed 
from “the Word,” but who could have run back to it, “hounded” 
it, chased after it “doggedly,” and perhaps even have heard or 
spoken it. 
But there is also the silence of latter-day dogs, locked in igno-
rance, fated never to know “the true Word,” although impelled 
by dog nature to investigate and question. 
Since the potential to discover “the Word” is lost today, si-
lence is what holds dogs together in their community. The 
communal bonds of dogs are forged in silence. Even questions, 
even replies, even the loudest barking of dogs are parts of this 
silence: a reminder that, while words or barks may be uttered, 
“the Word” shall never again be spoken or heard. 
In the same way, the original guilt of the original dogs, who 
condemned all future dogs to a life of ordinary communality but 
severance from the divine, is a (poisoned) gift to latter-day dogs, 
who now hasten “in almost guiltless silence toward death in a 
world darkened by others” (300).
Of course, should a dog attempt to reject his fate, his instinct, 
and, with apologies to Marx, his “species-being,” the guilt the 
dog experiences only brings him closer to the community of 
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dogs and their eternal silence, which is, after all, what our dog 
truly seeks. 
Perhaps the dream of no longer being a dog is shared by all 
dogs, even the most contented, ordinary dog. 
Perhaps this dream is dreamt a thousand times or more, 
perhaps every time a dog sleeps. But this dream, like the 
Word — and which may very well be “the Word,” itself — is nev-
er remembered, always forgotten. 
W.R. Bion suggests that, in our nascent states, we encoun-
ter proscriptions against seeking “the Word,” the ultimate truth, 
mainly from “Arf Arfer” [i.e., “Our Father Who Art in Heaven”] 
(Bion 1982; Grotstein 2007, 229).
But, of course, “the Word” is merely imagined, just as “Arf 
Arfer” is imagined. 
Both “the Word” and “Arf Arfer” are imagined and then im-
agined to have been lost. 
In guilt, we imagine them, then we imagine that we have 
abandoned “Arf Arfer” and His Word, or that they have aban-
doned us, which, psychologically, amounts to the same thing, 
since if we imagine to have been abandoned, we find ways to 
justify our abandonment by imagining that we deserved to be 
abandoned. 
In any case, we imagine that we cannot know “the Word” and 
that we are simultaneously condemned for our ignorance of it. 
Then, in our frustration and anxiety, we declare “the Word” 
to be a mystery, which, at least, is something that can be wor-
shipped in place of the absence of the Word and the divinity 
who held it.
Of course, this worship of the mystery that arises from the 
imagined loss of an imagined Word uttered by an imagined di-
vinity takes place in silence. 
The irresolubility of the mystery is attributed to our inherit-
ance of “instinct,” the “more profound cause of [our] scientific 
incapacity” (Kafka 1971, 315–16), but is, actually, the most basic 
necessity of this form of communal, religious practice.  
Finally, we imagine our “instinct not to know” to be our he-
reditary sin, leaving an indelible mark upon our identity. 
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We are guilty of the “sin of wanting to know” that which can-
not and ought not be known (Camus 1955, 49). 
Since we cannot be rid of our hereditary sin, all we can do 
is torment ourselves with endless investigations conducted in 




A Simple Heart, Father, and Flaubert
 
1.
Once my father could no longer walk the dogs and feed the 
ducks, the life rushed out of him as if it had been exorcized. 
Even the cancer doctors were flabbergasted. 
One day, he was scheduled for surgery. The next day, talk of 
hospices. The next day, he was sent home to die. 
I flew to Texas to say goodbye. 
2.
He lay on a couch in the living room and we held hands through 
his delirium.
He spent four hours alternating between sleep and confused 
consternation over whether — and, if so, how — to sit up.  
When he rose, his wife and I held him up like Jesus, and 
helped him urinate into a garbage can.
The only lucid gesture he made was out of character and not 
in jest. I asked him how he was feeling and he raised up his head, 
held his index finger to his temple like a gun, and made a child’s 
gunshot noise: “Pkkkkkew!”
He was not religious, but his wife insisted that, if their ashes 
were to be conjoined upon her death, he had to find belief. So 
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he spent his final days receiving visits from a priest, trying to 
convince himself that God was real. 
Even this coerced, death-bed conversion seemed to give him 
some comfort: He could pretend to believe he’d not be alone in 
a jar of ash for all eternity. 
3.
As a young child, age four or five, I walked with my father 
through Union Station in Chicago, Illinois. 
A young woman rapidly approached us and fastened an “I ♥ 
Chicago” pin on my shirt. Then she demanded a dollar from my 
father, to pay for the pin.
My father was horrified. He looked at me, of all people, for 
guidance. He panicked. 
He dropped his briefcase with a startle as the woman effec-
tively patted him down. 
When he finally turned out his pockets, a thousand pennies 
burst forth: a torrent of rusted blood, as if he’d hit an artery.
The pennies made a sound like shattering glass, one of the 
worst I’ve heard. 
My father went white, unable to stop the hemorrhage, as the 
pennies rolled in all directions across the station’s marble floors. 
Then, in his charcoal business suit, he got on his hands and 
knees to pick them up, while the woman and I stood motionless, 
in silence. 
I hated the woman and was ashamed of my father for reasons 
I could not understand. 
Worse, I felt sick because the situation was at least partly 
predicated on my father’s sincere but incorrect belief that I was 
interested in a worthless pin, foisted upon me indecently, which, 
since then, had been slowly tearing a hole in my threadbare t-
shirt.
(The other driver of the situation was my father’s discomfort 




How could I be interested in such a thing, a thing given in 
such a way, not even “given” so much as “extorted” from my 
father, who was so humble that he would rather crawl across a 
filthy floor than deny his son the merest trinket, a trinket whose 
interest was null but whose interest could never be explored 
because to discuss it would have been somehow akin to crawl-
ing across a filthy floor all over again? Was I a worthless thing 
for accepting the pin? Would pretending to cherish it make me 
worthless? Was my father worthless, bested by a rudimentary 
grift?   
The four-or-five-year-old versions of these thoughts tore 
through my head with the noise of a thousand pennies and the 
violence of metal ripping through a child’s t-shirt. 
I watched my father gather up his change, count a dollar’s 
worth, pay the woman, collect himself, and heave a sigh. I think 
I said, “Thanks, Dad.” 
4.
Over the years, when I visited my father — which typically in-
cluded a day of air travel, a rental car, an hours-long drive, and 
a stop at the grocery store for supplies — I would arrive to his 
absence. 
He would immediately leave to smoke, or run an errand, 
or go to the bathroom, or feed the ducks, as if he were over-
whelmed by the prospect of greeting me. 
It is terrible to consider what I must have been to him: a 
source of discomfort, anxiety, misinterest, fear.    
I don’t recall that he ever asked me a question about myself or 
my life. He did not know any details about me, where I worked, 
what I did. He did not keep my address or telephone number. 
Since talking was out of the question, eventually we hit upon 
doing activities together, while trying to relate, so we’d have 
quick access to a distraction from our surprising lack of rela-
tionship. For the last twenty years of his life, we played pool, 




My father played for hours every night. He studied the game 
obsessively. He ran leagues and tournaments anywhere he could: 
run-down pool halls and motorcycle bars. He gave money to the 
people he met. He let them stay at his house if they were fight-
ing with a boyfriend, girlfriend, husband, wife, or roommate. 
They used him for money. He bought one a used car he could 
hardly afford, which angered me for several reasons, not least 
because I was drowning in debt in graduate school, consider-
ing bankruptcy, working three jobs, and living without reliable 
transportation or health insurance.    
He never imagined I could be in need or pain. Eventually, I 
found myself going out of the way to tell him stories of travail, 
injury, sickness, tragedy, loss. He could not hear them. All he 
could say, between manic movements and yelling at the dogs 
and checking his watch, was, “Welp, you seem fine.”
One might say: This is a father who believes in his son. 
One might say, with greater precision: This is a father who 
knows his son in a certain way, who wishes to know an in-
vulnerable, almost omnipotent, son. The fantasy of this son is 
threatened by the real son’s life, which must never be explored.
In any case, with respect to the game of pool, I should have 
been no match for him, but when I visited, I won, or he lost, 
even if I ceased to try, perhaps because, to him, I was invulner-
able and omnipotent, or had to be. This phenomenon, which we 
were both forced to acknowledge, devastated him. 
Typically, when he became adequately unnerved, he would 
encourage me to go to the bar and drink a beer, so he could 
practice. 
So there I would sit, at a strange, suburban bar, watching my 
father shoot the same shot one hundred times, as he had done 
for years, talking to the billiard balls so easily, so comfortably, 
without any sign of tension. 
5.
As a child, when I got sad or scared, I was told to “just ignore it” 
or else, Dad said, “the boy in Cincinnati” would be happy. 
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It was with a kind of contrapasso, both more stark and less 
imaginative than Dante’s, that he understood the moral world: 
zero-sum, like a child or a Fundamentalist. 
This boy in Cincinnati, whom I had never met, was my en-
emy, and when I was happy, Dad said, the boy in Cincinnati was 
sad. 
When the boy in Cincinnati was loved, I was hated. 
When I erred, the boy in Cincinnati was rewarded. 
Sometimes the boy in Cincinnati must have felt good, at 
which point Mom would spank me and tell me she knew every-
thing inside of me, until I went to pieces.   
Dad did not approve of spanking, nor of discussions of what 
was inside of me, but was unable to intervene because such ac-
tivities could not be comprehended by the simple scale that was 
Cincinnati justice. 
6.
You could not have paid my father to read Flaubert, but if 
he had, he would have liked Félicité, the heroine of one of Flau-
bert’s best short works, the first of his Trois Contes: “Un Cœur 
Simple” [“A Simple Heart”]. 
“Simple” can mean many things: guilelessness, innocence, 
naturalness, and purity, but also provinciality, poverty, primitiv-
ism, and ignorance. 
Both father and Félicité had honorable instincts, worked tire-
lessly to provide for their families, economized, and served oth-
ers in their way. 
Father religiously fed, sheltered, and likely damaged the long-
term health of flocks of suburban ducks until he died. Félicité 
died in communion with her dead, stuffed parrot Loulou, in 
whose image she saw the Holy Ghost.  
At the first communion of her charge, Virginie, Félicité near-
ly fainted with joy. At our suburban church, my father stood 
silently during the weekly collective confession because he felt 
that he had not committed the (abstract) sins to which the con-
gregation was collectively confessing.   
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If we believe Showalter (1966), and see “A Simple Heart” as 
a kind of reply to Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, we find the names 
of the Aubain children in Bernardin’s story “Paul et Virginie.” 
Bernardin took a teenaged wife when he was in his fifties. She 
served as something of a domestic maid to him and bore him 
two children, Paul and Virginie, before dying of tuberculosis. 
Her name was Félicité.    
Flaubert and Bernardin corresponded only once or twice, 
but there is a central motif in Bernardin’s La chaumière indi-
enne [The Indian Hut] (1895, 285–89) that may shed light on the 
meaning of “A Simple Heart.” 
An academic and a pariah discuss how to find truth and hap-
piness. The academic asks: 
“With what sense or faculty shall we look for the truth, since 
the mind or the intelligence is not capable of finding it.” And 
the pariah says: “With a simple heart. The senses and the 
mind can be mistaken, but a simple heart can never be mis-
taken. A simple heart has never pretended to hear what it has 
not heard, nor pretended to believe what it does not believe. 
Even nature, if we consider it with a simple heart, we will 
be able to see God in it. We must search for the truth with a 
simple heart.” 
But the tragedy of a simple heart, is that a simple heart is not 
enough to live an adult life, a life of interest. 
My father was, I fear, too simple to find interest in his adult 
life, or in the lives of others, even in the lives of his children. 
Yet, he was too complex to enjoy the source of Félicité’s felic-
ity: that, as Showalter aptly remarks, she is so simple, ignorant, 
and submissive that “she can overlook a fact the rest of us cannot 
escape: that she deserves a better fate” (1966, 55).
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A Dream of Success
 
I’m sitting on the wooden floor of a cloistered, patchwork mon-
astery cut into the side of a mountain, awaiting the arrival of a 
grey-bearded man who is not my father but who is, nonetheless, 
not unfatherly. 
The enormous, ancient doors, covered with gold rings, will soon 
part to expose the dark, silent interior to fierce sunlight and ter-
rible wind.
I both dread and eagerly anticipate this moment. 
When the doors finally open and the fatherly man, barely vis-
ible, looms silently, I am overwhelmed by a violent sickness that 
rushes through my gut. 
I begin to sob. 
I feel around the floor and find a sharp rock, which I instinctive-
ly hurl at the man, and yet I also want him, need him, to enter, as 
his willingness to join me signifies something about my worth.  
The man enters and I know instantly that I have succeeded, that 
I am saved, saved from myself, made good. 
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But I also know that this salvation comes at a grave cost because, 
in exchange for such grace, I must forsake an element of myself, 
something I have never truly encountered but that I neverthe-
less hold dear, or that I ought to hold dear, or that I ought to 
have held dear. 
I must physically expel from my body this element and roll it 
out the doors and down the mountainside into the valley, where 
the snow and ice will quickly bury it and where, after the thaw, 
wolves will devour it. 
In response to this exchange and my anxiety about it, my body 
collapses into a fleshy liquid and forms a sort of puddle, much 
of which remains upon the monastery’s floor, but some of which 
manages to ooze beneath the great doors and to slide down and 






Voir dire does not mean what the New York State government 
thinks it means. 
When, finally, I had to submit myself for jury duty, everyone 
was made to watch a video starring actors from the television 
series, Law and Order. 
It started, without warning, on each TV of a four-TV cluster 
bolted to the ceiling of an awful, underground waiting room. 
The video was incredibly loud. It commanded attention. 
“There’s no escape!” I said out loud, and looked to others 
near me for a smile or nod or some form of confirmation, find-
ing none.  
What I wanted to say, but refrained from saying, was that the 
four-TV cluster — broadcasting itself to all points of the com-
pass — is a sort of inverted panopticon that transforms even 
contemporary waiting areas into prison houses (see Bentham 
1791). 
2.
The (conscious) aim of the video was to offer viewers an intro-
duction to the history and nature of judicial processes. 
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I had the powerful sense while watching it that I was being 
put on, not least because it reduced the entirety of legal history 
to three (Western) epochs and still managed to caricature them 
terribly. 
First, there was ancient Rome, where trials were dominated 
by the authority of judges (boo!). 
Then, there were the “middle ages,” in which no legal proce-
dure existed except the trial by ordeal: mobs of dirty townsfolk 
tormenting accused persons, to full Monty Pythonesque effect 
(boo!). 
Finally, there was the modern American legal system, para-
gon of reason and rectitude (yay!).  
Voir dire, the video went on to say, came from the French 
verbs, voir, meaning to see, and dire, meaning to say. 
So, voir dire, the blaring video announced, meant to see what 
prospective jurors will say. 
“That’s wrong!” I said out loud, again half-hoping for some 
kind of acknowledgment, and again finding none. 
This obvious lack of empathetic, emotional, or intellectual 
relatedness between me and my comrades added to the self-
hatred and disgust I was already feeling. 
You see, I was fairly revolted at myself because, of a large, 
fairly random sample of citizens of Buffalo, NY — or even, one 
might say, of a sample skewed toward those without the where-
withal to evade jury duty — I was the only one to show up sub-
stantially late. 
If there were statistical significance to this datum, it would 
demonstrate that my life, my discipline, and my self were all less 
“together” than everyone else’s. 
3.
In any case, the French would be the old French voir(e), with 
a Latin root of verum [truth], because the point is not just to 
see whatever crap spills out of jurors’ mouths — I slipped into 





Once we were called into the courtroom, the judge pulled eleven 
of us up into the jury box at a time, while the rest waited in the 
gallery: the rows, like pews, that hold the court’s audience. 
When the District Attorney — “Must be an important case,” I 
thought, this time keeping my thoughts to myself — asked eve-
ryone’s profession and discovered I was a professor, he instantly 
looked worried, became condescending, and treated me like a 
dangerous fool. It was enraging to hear him speak. 
He asked me, condescendingly, “Can you understand that 
there may be variability in witness accounts and interpretations 
of events? And can you understand that that this doesn’t mean 
you should just throw out everything everyone says?” 
“Yes,” I replied, wishing to say, “Can you meet me outside so 
I can beat the shit out of you?” 
“Because,” he continued, “sometimes people like yourself, 
doctors and such, like to see things clearly, in black and white, 
true and false.”
“Uh huh,” I muttered, wishing to say, “You could not be more 
stupid or wrong, you fucking pompous dolt.”  
5.
Later, he asked if anyone had been charged with a crime, and, if 
so, to raise your hand, explain the charge, and say a few words 
about how the experience “might affect you as a juror.”
One man said he had been charged with domestic violence. 
When asked what the result of the charges were, the man mut-
tered, “anger management,” angrily. 
When pressed by the judge to say whether he had been “con-
victed” or “acquitted,” the man, who clearly never understood 
these words nor their implications for his own legal status, 
merely said that “it makes him real angry” that, when he tells 
people he’s been charged with domestic violence, “everyone as-
sumes it was physical violence,” that he beat his wife. 
Instead, he insisted, “not all violence is physical.” 
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His was “mental.” 
It was “mental violence.” 
And — we could rest assured — it would not affect his ability 
to administer justice at all.  
6.
District Attorney: “Has anyone else ever been charged or con-
victed of a crime?” 
Juror #10 (Me): “Including misdemeanors?” 
District Attorney: “Yes.” 
Juror #10 (Me): “I pled no contest to jumping a subway turn-
stile in Manhattan in 1992.” 
District Attorney, Judge, seated jury pool, and audience: [Loud 
laughter] 
District Attorney: “Okay [continued laughter]. Can everyone 
seated promise to be impartial and to leave all personal 
sympathies, beliefs, and emotions behind?  
Juror #10 (Me): “I am sorry to be picky here but I am getting 
confused about the extent to which you want to hear about 
our beliefs. For instance, I have certain beliefs about the po-
lice, about incarceration, and about the judicial system. Do 
you want us to disclose these things that might make impar-
tiality difficult for us, which is not to say impossible — and 
even this would only be possible to the extent that we are 
conscious of them — or do you want us to say whether we 
think we can be impartial in spite of what beliefs or biases 
we may have?”
Judge [dismissively]: “That question is way too complicated.”
District Attorney, Judge, seated jury pool, and audience: [Loud 
laughter] 
Me: “Okay.” 
District Attorney, Judge, seated jury pool, and audience: [Mild 
laughter] 
[Ninety minutes later] 
Judge: “Juror #10 is dismissed.”
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How To Be a Victim:  
Camus’s Plagues and Poisons
 
1.
In 1947, Gallimard published Algerian-French writer Albert Ca-
mus’s allegorical novel, La peste [The Plague]. It would become 
an important part of Camus’s candidacy for the Nobel Prize in 
Literature, awarded to him in 1957. While many scholars feel 
that The Plague is not Camus’s best work, its worldwide popular-
ity has made it one of the best-known works of art concerning 
plagues, rivaling Boccaccio’s Decameron, Daniel Dafoe’s A Jour-
nal of the Plague Year, and Ingmar Bergman’s film, The Seventh 
Seal.
In Camus’s The Plague, a mysterious disease suddenly strikes 
the town of Oran, whose borders are quickly closed and many of 
whose residents quickly become ill and die. Through the voices 
of his protagonists, Dr. Bernard Rieux and journalist-turned-
activist Jean Tarrou, Camus shakes his fist at the plague, at the 
world, at God, and at all who are not adequately outraged, ask-
ing how such misery could ever be justified.
But Camus’s novel is not really about a plague. Written in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the plague it describes is 




What is more, The Plague is ultimately concerned not with 
either a bacillus or a war, but with our moral stance against 
them. The plague, itself, is a prop for the ethical and existential 
dilemmas raised by the reality of human suffering and the prob-
lem of choosing how and when to fight, whom to spare, and 
whom to cast aside. 
The Plague asks: How should we live in a time of terror? Are 
we permitted to love and to be happy, or must we sacrifice our 
personal projects for the sake of combatting suffering? Are we 
permitted to flee, either in body or in mind? And how can we 
avoid the attitude of Cottard, who embraces the plague as a great 
equalizer, a crisis that eclipses his crimes and fears? 
Camus never answers these questions directly, of course. 
But his characters and their (often heavy-handed) monologues 
give us ample clues as to his thoughts. Camus was concerned 
primarily with what we might call “moral plague”: not with the 
fact that some people will inevitably die untimely deaths due to 
disease, neglect, war, crime, poverty, and the like, but with the 
likelihood that the rest of us will find ways to rationalize this 
suffering and these deaths. 
That our acceptance of the reality of “plague” made us carri-
ers of “plague” was Camus’s greatest concern, and, perhaps, his 
least convincing moral-philosophical line of argument.  
2.
In The Plague, Dr. Bernard Rieux leaves his ailing wife in a sani-
tarium outside the city, while he remains in the town of Oran, 
tirelessly fighting the plague. Dr. Rieux knows that his efforts are 
largely futile, for the plague will run its course and take its toll. 
He also knows that he must become a partly oppressive so-
lution to the largely oppressive problem of the epidemic. Dr. 
Rieux must scan citizens for symptoms, must separate ill from 
well members of families, and must send the infected to make-
shift hospitals that resemble concentration camps. He must sac-
rifice some for the good of others. He and his workers do not 
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even discuss taking their services into the Arab Quarter, whose 
residents are ravaged by pestilence and are all but annihilated. 
Much of Rieux’s personality is effaced by his work. He loses 
something profound within himself: his vital spirit or his crea-
tive spark, perhaps. One wonders whether this loss permits him 
to do his job so effectively, to separate and quarantine, to con-
demn and to heal.    
Camus’s Plague seeks to remind us that it is when we forget 
our inevitable susceptibility to “carrying” moral plagues that we 
become agents and transmitters ourselves. That is, especially in 
times of plague, we must be vigilantly on guard against our own 
temptation to seek solace in nihilism, neutrality, indifference, or 
moral absolutism. 
3.
Of course, a part of us longs for plagues, depends on them. 
Plagues are exciting. Plagues relieve us of daily stresses. Hys-
terical media coverage and conversations about the terror of the 
month (from ebola to avian flu to dirty bombs to mass shoot-
ings to neo-Nazi rallies) ought to make us aware of the part of us 
that relishes disaster or the possibility of disaster. 
Plagues also offer us the opportunity to feel innocent. The 
more evil the plague, the more gruesome the terror, the more 
innocent we feel in voicing our condemnation or opposition. 
Plagues, in this sense, become necessary evils, necessary pri-
marily for the maintenance of certain psychological states that 
have become increasingly common: the state of perennial wari-
ness and victimhood, identification with the oppressed, and the 
mentality of a survivalist. 
We depend upon plagues to give our quest for survival the 
moral standing we feel it deserves. 
Unfortunately, the state of mind that is best suited for sur-
viving plagues, while it may seem attractive when a group of 
attractive TV characters pull together to slaughter zombies or 
vampires, is not a state of mind that is particularly conducive 
to doing the difficult, often tedious work of being, doing, and 
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relating as whole, active persons in highly complex, political, 
civil, and interpersonal environments, where problems are not 
as simple as life or death, good or evil, plague or cure. 
When each decision is framed as a matter of survival, when 
the government itself is presented as an entity that can either 
save or destroy us, when our popular discourse skips from cri-
sis to crisis, perhaps hoping each time that in vanquishing the 
present enemy we will vanquish them all, then we know we are 
not merely in a state of crisis, but in a state of dependency upon 
crisis. 
4.
Contra Camus, it does not help to shake our fist at the world, at 
humanity, at the government, or at God, asking for an authority 
to justify or rectify what has been done. 
The real “moral plague” that confronts us is one in which 
we are tempted to lurch from tragedy to tragedy, feeling all the 
while that there isn’t much a person can do — and perhaps there 
isn’t — to fight the seemingly unending succession of evils. 
We dread becoming identified with victimizers and plague 
agents, so we decide we must become victims and change 
agents. We defend against our impotence by indulging in fanta-
sies of omnipotence. We may even create or amplify crises, hop-
ing that, in the new crises, our feelings of helplessness and irrel-
evance will be replaced with the feeling of aliveness and activity. 
Here we must call upon a rudimentary distinction between, 
on one hand, change as an activity in which things — the self, 
the group, an institution, a policy, et cetera — are made new or 
different from what they were, and, on the other hand, change 
as a component of group identity and a fantasy of omnipotence. 
5.
Consider the late Elie Wiesel, who remarked in his 1986 No-
bel Peace Prize acceptance speech: “We must always take sides. 
Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encour-
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ages the tormentor, never the tormented. […] Wherever men 
or women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or po-
litical views, that place must — at that moment — become the 
center of the universe” (quoted in Reilly 2016).
There are at least two remarkable things about this passage. 
The first is the way that an odd idea — that neutrality is never 
neutral — is presented as an obvious truth, in no need of expla-
nation or evidence. That this argument is presented in this way 
tells us something about its psychic meaning: that it is not really 
intended to be a philosophical claim about neutrality, nor an 
empirical claim about politics or history. 
Instead, the statement expresses an identification with a 
group, a group for whom the words spoken require no evidence 
because they are already known and are, therefore, self-evident. 
While this group may be abstract, and likely consists of multiple 
overlapping groups, what the large group shares is an identifica-
tion with the victims of oppression. 
The claim, then, that neutrality always helps the oppressor 
is really a watchword that defines the group organized around 
identification with the oppressed. This group also conceives of 
the world as containing only two groups, the oppressors and the 
oppressed, such that no one is permitted to stand outside or in 
between.  
The second striking aspect of this portion of Wiesel’s speech 
is his exhortation to make every site of oppression or victimi-
zation a momentary “center of the universe.” This notion, that 
places of violence, trauma, and persecution must become 
metaphorical centers of the universe, expresses a fantasy about 
change and victimization that will be elaborated immediately 
below. 
For now, we may describe the fantasy as one in which the 
group’s victimization becomes “central” to everyone else in the 
world. Here, the “gravity” of victims’ suffering pulls together all 
that exists, incorporating all into a single moral universe where 
everything “revolves” around the victim’s experience, beliefs, 
and fantasies. This change would indeed be “cosmic”: It would 
privilege the victim and would demarcate the movements of 
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both victims and victimizers, while casting to the outer reaches 
of space those least involved with victimization.
The fantasy suggested by Wiesel’s speech is one in which vic-
tims stand at the center of a new moral “universe,” pushing and 
pulling others along prescribed paths, moving and activating all 
those around them. 
If we stay with this metaphor, the activity of the victims im-
plied here is twofold: on one hand, the center does not move but 
remains stationary, while other objects revolve around it; on the 
other hand, to the extent that this center has mass, it gradually 
pulls in and, eventually, consumes everything in its gravitational 
field.
6.
The difference I am highlighting here is the difference between 
being the “center of the universe,” on one hand, and being a 
“center of initiative” (Kohut 1977, 99), on the other. To be the 
latter is to be a creative and autonomous agent capable of ini-
tiating thought, action, and change in the world and, simulta-
neously, relating to others as separate subjects, external to the 
self. Placing victimization, persecution, or trauma at the center 
of a moral universe encourages persons and groups to become, 
in Cathy Caruth’s words, centers or “site[s] of [shared] trauma” 
(1995, 11), rather than centers or sites of autonomous being, do-
ing, and relating. 
Due to limitations of space, it is impossible here to give a 
complete accounting of the process by which the valorization of 
suffering and trauma impedes real change (Bowker 2016). What 
may be said is that in idealization of victimhood and suffering 
we find a fantasized hypertrophy and monopolization of subjec-
tivity, such that the victimized person or group envisions itself 
to be the only vital, active agent in the world. 
This grandiose fantasy appears as a “reaction formation” 
against experiences or convictions of utter powerlessness. The 
concomitant denial of separateness, reality, and agency to oth-
ers leaves the person or group in sole possession of the power 
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to make change, and yet, as Wiesel’s astronomical metaphor re-
minds us, the central object does not move or change but only 
induces movement and change in others. 
While this fantasy of change offers a kind of hope, it is, in 
many respects, a deeply conservative fantasy, if we may so speak, 
for its primary objective is to secure the identification with the 
victim, rather than to act in ways that make meaningful differ-
ences for the self or others. Dedication to this fantasy serves not 
only to defend against the conviction that the self or group is 
powerless, but to distract from other threats to the identity of 
the person or group. 
As some readers will know, there are many individuals, fami-
lies, and organizations who are “addicted” to change of a certain 
kind: disruptive, chaotic, and superficial change (see, e.g., Ka-
gan and Schlosberg 1989). Crisis, urgency, and turbulence serve, 
paradoxically, to stabilize such persons or groups: They remain, 
somehow, in “the center of the storm.” In such cases, “change” 
both defines the identity of the person or group and distracts 
from awareness of threatening realities, the most threatening of 
which is the need for meaningful, substantive, internal change. 
Such a situation, then — opposed, as it is, to much of the 
psychoanalytic enterprise — may be described not merely as 
“change for change’s sake,” but, more precisely, as change for the 
sake of not changing. As David Levine suggests in his extraor-
dinary essay, we may understand a good deal of organizational 
change in terms of a manic state: “manic” in that it relies on a 
“fantasized identification between a primitive self and its ideal” 
(1999, 231), and “manic” in the more causal sense of urgent, 
frenzied, and compulsively-driven activity that defends against 
contact with what is real in the self, the organization, and the 
world.
7.
Camus once insisted that “he who has understood reality does 
not rebel against it, but rejoices in it; in other words, he becomes 
a conformist” (1956, 156). To be engaged in Camus’s fantasy of 
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change — to be a “rebel,” which is Camus’s more romantic term 
for today’s “change agent” — then, requires a misunderstanding 
of reality that precludes real change. 
When we refuse to understand reality, we refuse to under-
stand the psychic meaning of “reality” as a place where others 
and events exist independently of ourselves. In such a world, 
there are no boundaries, and therefore, no possibility of relating, 
communicating, or thinking; only joining or opposing, conspir-
ing or rebelling. 
When the fantasy described above is operative, the language 
used to describe change — its nature, its necessity, its goal — is 
vague and grandiose, characterized by an urgency and a vigi-
lance that borders on compulsiveness, and features reactive ele-
ments more prominently than active ones (i.e., a preoccupation 
with monitoring and reacting to stimuli that confirm the beliefs 
and assumptions of the group). 
In some cases, the changes demanded are so extreme that 
they may be understood to be impossible by design. In this case, 
we can see how the conservative element in the fantasy directly 
opposes any truly “progressive” activity it purports to under-
take: Making impossible demands or insisting upon impossible 
changes stymies efforts to create real change and, most likely, 
entrenches resistance and opposition to change. But, of course, 
failure to achieve change and success in provoking resistance, as 
discussed above, may well be the unconscious goals embedded 
in this sort of activity.
Admittedly, the fantasies and realities of change are not so 
easily distinguishable when faced with the challenges of daily 
life. 
8.
Let us consider something smaller, and, perhaps, more personal. 
Camus’s early three-act play Le malentendu [The Misunder-
standing] borrows thematic elements from classical tragedy, al-
ludes explicitly to Gospel narrative, references structural and 
character elements from the Renaissance commedia dell’arte, 
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and propels its action in ways reminiscent of situation comedies 
modernized by Shakespeare but perhaps most familiar to con-
temporary audiences via televised serials.
The plot of The Misunderstanding is rather simple: Jan is a 
wealthy, married, middle-aged man who, on hearing of his fa-
ther’s death, returns after twenty years of absence to the small 
Moravian inn where his mother and sister live and work. 
Jan is not immediately recognized by his family, due, in part, 
to his extended absence and, in part, to his mother’s and sister’s 
habit of sparing attention to guests whom they intend to rob 
and murder. Jan also takes care to hide his identity from them, 
ostensibly in order to gather information about them, to gain “a 
better notion of what to do to make them happy” (Camus 1958, 
84), and to set up a joyful surprise when he eventually reveals 
himself.
Jan’s ruse is protested by his wife, Maria, who accompanies 
him but whom he sends away for his first night at the inn. Jan’s 
mother and sister, Martha, mistaking him for a wealthy solitary 
traveler, murder him and dump his body in the river before his 
identity is revealed. 
Upon realizing what she has done, his mother drowns her-
self in the river where she and Martha killed Jan. Martha, now 
alone and in despair, will hang herself. Maria in agonizing grief, 
pleads for help and mercy but is heard only by an aged, taciturn 
servant, who replies, simply: “No.”
9.
Beyond associations with Camus’s absurd philosophy, there are 
two main “moral” conclusions scholars have derived from the 
play. The first is that Jan’s quest for recognition, for his identity 
to be seen and known by his family, is impossible and, thus, is 
destined to bring disaster. 
Jan, on this account, suffers from a sort of Hegelian hubris, 
believing he can be recognized and that his family’s recognition 




Certainly, such an interpretation seems to fit Camus’s philo-
sophical project, which asks us to recognize that our “sin[ful]” 
desire to know and our “wild longing for clarity” are unfulfill-
able, impossible, and destructive (1955, 21). To chase after un-
derstanding and recognition seems, in some of Camus’s writing, 
to lead only to violence and death, whereas internalizing the in-
evitability of failure — as in our fundamental “absurdity” — per-
mits us to survive (see Bowker 2014).
The second, and nearly opposite, interpretation is that the 
play proclaims the ethical necessity of open dialogue and com-
munication, while condemning silence and obfuscation (see, 
e.g., Matherne 1971, 74–77; Willhoite 1968, 64–66). This conclu-
sion was advanced by Camus, himself, after the play suffered a 
poor reception. Camus claimed it was
a play of revolt, perhaps even containing a moral of sincerity. 
[…] If a man wants to be recognized, one need only tell him 
who he is. If he shuts up or lies, he will die alone, and every-
thing around him is destined for misery. If, on the contrary, 
he speaks the truth, he will doubtless die, but after having 
helped himself and others to live. (quoted in Todd 2000, 186)
This extremely facile interpretation, although offered by the au-
thor himself, is confounding and perhaps backward, for recog-
nizing a person surely means something other than “tell[ing]” 
that person “who he is.” In the best of cases, this interpretation 
would flatten an already bare drama, making The Misunder-
standing the simplest of cautionary tales.
Indeed, such an interpretation closely resembles the simplis-
tic conclusion reached by Meursault when Camus places a pro-
totype of the story of The Misunderstanding in L’ étranger [The 
Stranger]. Here, Meursault describes the idea of hiding one’s 
identity from one’s family as “a joke” (plaisanterie) (Camus 1988, 
80). If “nothing distinguishes jokes or jests more from other 
psychological structures than their double-sidedness or duplic-
ity” (Freud 1960, 213–14), then jokes must always conceal or 
confound their own expression, must “muddle” their true inten-
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tions (Camus 1958, 83), and, in this sense, must always miscom-
municate and must always be misunderstood.
Of the story, Meursault concludes: “On the one hand it wasn’t 
very likely. On the other, it was perfectly natural. Anyway, I 
thought the traveler pretty much deserved what he got and that 
you shouldn’t play games” (Camus 1988, 80). While Meursault 
is not always the keenest observer of human emotion, he is right 
that Jan’s gambit is like a joke and a game because it appears to 
be a species of play, play being a form of creative experimen-
tation where impulses are heeded and where some departures 
from the rules of reality are tolerated, as in the dramatic me-
dium called the play. 
10.
It may seem callous to discuss a drama full of violence and trag-
edy in relation to jokes or games or play. But there is something 
to be learned in this comparison. First, it reminds us that Jan’s 
actions express impulses and fantasies that may belong to the 
periods of life in which playing is of the greatest import: infancy 
and childhood. 
Second, Jan does not play well, not only because the conse-
quences of his playing are disastrous, but because he is unable 
to enact or realize his play in the space between his subjective 
imagination and his objective interactions with his mother and 
sister. This makes his playing frustrating and agonizing, to him 
and to Maria, who strenuously objects to his ruse on precisely 
these grounds, insisting that “there’s something […] something 
morbid about the way you’re doing this” (Camus 1958, 83).
Contrary to the two “moral” conclusions cited above, the real 
tragedy of The Misunderstanding derives from Jan’s unconscious 
desire to re-experience his family’s misrecognition and neglect, 
a traumatic experience he suffered years ago, which he re-lives 
by undertaking an elaborate deception. 
One clue about the unconscious motivations of Jan’s actions 
comes when he describes his ruse as the inevitable result of his 
“dreams,” by which he seems to mean both dreams experienced 
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in sleep and hopes of a happy reunion with his family, upon 
which depends his ability to “find his true place in the world” 
(1958, 87). 
Jan’s dedication to his unlikely “dream” of resolving twenty 
years of estrangement and psychological suffering by orches-
trating a surprise announcement of himself remains strong even 
as he begins to realize the potentially devastating outcomes of 
his actions. 
This inflexible pursuit of his “dream,” in spite of his family’s 
clear inability to respond in the way he had hoped, also tells us 
something about Jan’s unconscious motivations and, therefore, 
about one of the subtler malentendus in the play.
What really compels Jan to play this trick on his family? Why 
does he not heed his wife’s advice to announce himself immedi-
ately? Maria oversimplifies things, but is not entirely wrong in 
suggesting that, “on such occasions one says, ‘It’s I,’ and then it’s 
all plain sailing.” 
It is “common sense,” she argues, that “if one wants to be 
recognized, one starts by telling one’s name. […] Otherwise, by 
pretending to be what one is not, one simply muddles every-
thing” (Camus 1958, 83). 
It would seem sensible for Jan to introduce himself, as Ma-
ria instructs him, to say: “I’m your son. This is my wife. I’ve 
been living with her in a country we both love, a land of end-
less sunshine beside the sea. But something was lacking there to 
complete my happiness, and now I feel I need you” (84). But, of 
course, for Jan, and for Camus, and likely for many others, relat-
ing to one’s family is not “so simple as all that” (84). 
Jan tells Maria that one of his aims in concealing his iden-
tity is to “take this opportunity of seeing [his mother and sister] 
from the outside” (83), to become informed about how to make 
his family happy. But it is not clear why Jan should expect his 
family to be more revealing or honest when standing before a 
stranger than before a son. Furthermore, to see others “from the 
outside” by making them naïve about one’s identity risks expos-
ing them to embarrassment, registered by a hidden “eye” (a hid-
den “I”) of which they are unaware.
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Jan’s aim to hide, then reveal, his identity is a type of decep-
tion that manipulates the emotions of his family, and perhaps 
his own emotions as well. Jan has made the family naïve about 
an important piece of information. To make someone naïve, as 
in practical jokes, may lead the naïve person to speak or act in 
a way that is inappropriate, humiliating, or shocking to those 
privy to the withheld information. The “practical joke,” as it 
were, is “on” the naïve person because she is not “in” on the joke. 
The victim of such a joke is “unmasked” when she who once 
loomed large is revealed to be flawed or ridiculous. As in satire, 
a portion of the pleasure of joking lies in depicting those who 
are exalted (erhaben) as vulgar or stupid (Freud 1960, 248).
For Freud, in joking, in satire, and in deceptions, we experi-
ment with aggressive impulses, in which we discover a way to 
inflict suffering upon others without excessive guilt. More spe-
cifically, deceptions and jokes of this nature impose upon their 
victims experiences resembling the helplessness of childhood 
(Freud 1960, 280–84): The naïve subject of the joke is exposed 
in a moment of childlike confusion, ignorance, humiliation, or 
anxiety, particularly when provoked into losing control or un-
wittingly transgressing social or moral norms. This aggressive 
impulse to provoke, then witness, helplessness in others likely 
arises in connection with the instigator’s own experiences of 
helplessness, although such experiences are not always con-
sciously recalled. In this way, such deceptions may actually be 
attempts to transmit painful or traumatic experiences onto oth-
ers via projective identification, to re-experience them through 
others, and even to forge renewed connections with others 
based upon a suffering now shared.
It is important, in the context of The Misunderstanding, to 
ask how Jan’s family members could be expected to feel after 
having been seen “from the outside” treating their own son and 
brother as a perfect stranger, selling him beer and making up 
his room. Although Jan’s mother is devastated at having taken 
part in his murder, it is not precisely her killing of Jan that she 
laments most profoundly. Rather, she is deeply aggrieved by her 
mistaking of Jan. “When a mother is no longer capable of rec-
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ognizing her own son,” she claims, “it’s clear that her role on 
earth is ended” (Camus 1958, 120). Even had Jan not been mur-
dered, it is certain that his ruse would have succeeded in making 
his mother’s misrecognition of him all too clear. It seems likely, 
therefore, that Jan’s aim is not to happily surprise his family by 
exposing his identity, but to expose his family’s failure to recog-
nize him. Of course, Jan succeeds in exposing this failure, and 
thereby re-experiences the earlier traumatic instance of this fail-
ure, all too well.
11.
Jan’s first line of defense against the idea of openly communi-
cating is to suggest that he has played no part in the deception. 
When he is “given a glass of beer, against payment,” “received 
[…] without a word,” and “looked at, but [not] seen” (Camus, 
1958, 82–83, emphasis in original), he claims to be stunned, de-
ciding only at that moment to remain silent and “let things take 
their course.” 
Maria correctly objects, however, that there is no “thing” 
to take its course, that, instead, the “thing” to which Jan refers 
is actually “another of those ideas of yours.” To this comment 
Jan retorts: “It wasn’t an idea of mine, Maria; it was the force of 
things” (83).
Jan’s denial of his part in fabricating the deception, a denial 
of his own free will, suggests that he is once again silenced by 
his family’s treatment of him, that he finds himself paralyzed, 
perhaps re-experiencing the moment when his mother sent him 
off so coldly twenty years before. “My mother didn’t come to kiss 
me,” Jan recalls, tellingly. “At the time I thought I didn’t care” 
(82). This withholding of affection, this non-existent farewell by 
Jan’s mother, involves the rejection of him at a precarious mo-
ment of separation, at the very moment when he literally sepa-
rated himself from his family.
Jan’s mother’s rejection of him at this moment expresses her 
rejection of him as a separate self, her refusal or inability to 
relate with him as someone other than a family member. This 
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event, and what it likely reflects about a pattern of behavior in 
Jan’s family, appear to have been to some degree traumatic for 
Jan, not only because of their lasting effects on his emotional 
life and his inability to be happy, but in the “latency” or delay 
(Nachträglichkeit) of their impacts: “At the time I thought I 
didn’t care.”
Jan does not feel that he has a choice. His deception appears 
to him to be necessary, just as he assigns responsibility for his 
choices to forces outside of himself. Imagining one’s choices to 
be necessary consequences of forces outside of the self is one 
way to misunderstand oneself, to remain unaware of one’s true 
intentions, and to pursue aims about which one remains uncon-
scious. 
Externalizing necessity and responsibility is also common in 
repetitive and ritualized behavior, particularly that associated 
with the compulsive element in traumatic repetition: the feeling 
that one is not in control, that one is “forced” to re-visit a trau-
matic scene either literally, in dreams, or in obsessive behaviors 
that express or reflect traumatic material. 
12.
While little is offered by Camus on the subject of Jan’s child-
hood, conversations between his mother and Martha suggest 
that in his family — as was likely the case in Camus’s own fam-
ily — one is either “in” or “out.” Even when “in,” of course, one 
is not recognized as a separate person but merely as a family 
member. 
Incredibly, Jan’s mother fully admits as much, saying she 
“might have forgotten her daughter [Martha], too,” if Martha 
hadn’t “kept beside me all these years […] probably that’s why I 
know she is my daughter” (95). 
Martha is only known by her mother, only recognized, be-
cause she is literally beside her mother. She is only recognized 
as a mother’s daughter, not as an individual.
The mother’s rejection of Jan at the moment of his physical 
departure therefore seems to reflect a dilemma of relating that 
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predated it, a dilemma in which relatedness with family mem-
bers across difference or distance was impossible. Faced with 
such a dilemma, Jan would have had to choose between being 
absolutely exiled and, in some sense, “dead” to his family, and 
being permanently “beside” his family only to receive acknowl-
edgment as a family member. 
In other words, in such a family as Jan’s, there is no related-
ness. Instead, there is a schizoid either/or, whereby one either 
exists in an immersive co-presence with the family, or, if one 
attempts separation in any of its forms, one does not exist at all. 
Once Jan decides to leave his family, he ceases to exist. Thus, 
for his mother, there was, in some sense, no one there to kiss 
farewell.
Children raised in conditions similar to these are forced to 
make a terrible choice at a young age: to identify with a par-
ent’s or the family’s needs and to serve those needs as a family 
member, or to face emotional exile by heeding the child’s need 
to explore and discover something authentic and unique within 
himself (see, e.g., Miller 1997; Winnicott 1965). 
Of course, since the child is both physically and emotionally 
dependent upon the parent and the family, the choice is really 
no choice at all, as such children must almost instinctively learn 
to repress not only their needs but their awareness of them, for 
any outbursts of emotion reflective of their discomfort — for in-
stance, rage at those who demand self-negation, or grief at the 
loss of self-expression — would only provoke retaliation from 
the family in the form of further neglect, deprivation, or aban-
donment.
These dynamics are readily apparent throughout the play, 
particularly when Jan speaks about his sense of “duty” toward 
his family (Camus 1958, 84–85), a rather mysterious duty, pre-
sumably neglected for twenty years, by which he must now 
make a conscious effort to procure the family’s “happ[iness]” 
(84), while at the same time refusing to announce his true iden-
tity, and while misrecognizing and repressing his own needs in 
relation to his family. “I don’t need them,” he insists, “but I real-
ized they may need me” (84).
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13.
Jan does admit a desire to “find his true place in the world” (87), 
and the play asks us to imagine that he strives to establish this 
place by returning to his family and “making happy those I love. 
[…] I don’t look any farther” (87). But, of course, Jan’s act of 
concealing his identity succeeds neither in making his family 
happy nor in bringing him closer to finding his “true place.” The 
“true place” Jan seeks is really a regressive experience, an experi-
ence meant to substitute for a genuine “place” for himself amidst 
his family, which he knows to be impossible. 
This regressive experience Jan seeks is, in many ways, the op-
posite of finding a home or a “place,” for he unconsciously de-
sires not to be recognized but to be misrecognized, not to be 
welcomed but to be rebuffed, not to find joy and reunion but to 
re-encounter his rage and grief at his unfeeling expulsion from 
the family.
To understand these claims, we must recall that although Jan 
has clearly designed his charade in advance, telling Maria that 
her unexpected presence at the hotel “will upset all [his] plans” 
(82), when he enters the inn, he says that he “expected a wel-
come like the prodigal son’s” (83). 
Why, we may wonder, would Jan consider playing his trick if 
he sincerely expected such a joyous reception? Since this is not 
the sole reference to the story of the prodigal son in the Book 
of Luke — later, Jan raises the cup of poisoned tea to his lips and 
calls it “the feast of the returning prodigal” (109) — and since 
that story is, itself, full of ambivalence, misrecognition, and re-
sentment between members of a family, it is worth a moment to 
analyze this reference.
In Luke, the prodigal son, having wasted his inheritance 
“with riotous living,” now in fear of starvation, returns to his 
father, saying: “I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight, 
and am no more worthy to be called thy son” (15:21, KJV). The 
ashamed son plans to offer himself as a servant to his father’s 
household, as he feels assured that he no longer deserves recog-
nition even as a member of the family (15:19). 
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But the prodigal son’s father rejoices that “this my son was 
dead, and is alive again” (15:24), giving him fine robes and pre-
paring a lavish feast in his honor. Such treatment arouses jeal-
ous rage in the elder brother, who complains that, while he has 
toiled and served beside his father his whole life, he has never 
been given such gifts nor inspired comparable joy in his father. 
In reply, the father attempts to reassure the elder son of his in-
delible membership in the family: “Son, thou art ever with me, 
and all that I have is thine” (15:31).
Jan’s reference to this story and his self-identification as the 
prodigal son, then, suggest several things about his feelings and 
intentions regarding his family. Although he has not wasted his 
family’s fortune on debauchery, he feels ashamed. He is likely 
aware of the possibility of a negative or unsatisfying reception. 
He may fear, in particular, the reaction of his sister Martha, who 
has remained by her mother’s side and, in so doing, has not en-
joyed the same freedom, travel, romance, or fortune as he has. 
He may feel or anticipate guilt at the contrast between his seem-
ingly separate existence and his sister’s lifelong enmeshment 
with their mother and their home. 
Jan’s mother’s treatment of Martha is similar to that of the 
father toward the elder son in the story of the prodigal: The fa-
ther’s reply to the elder son does not directly address the elder’s 
son’s complaint that he has never been “recognized” as special 
or worth celebrating. Instead, the father offers an erasure of 
boundaries between the son, the father, and all that belongs to 
the family: The elder son’s unique self is still overlooked, while, 
in returning from “the dead,” the prodigal son seems to have 
found a form of loving recognition.
Like the prodigal son, Jan fears announcing himself and in-
curring the rejection of his family because he has at least partly 
internalized his family’s insistence that his separateness is tan-
tamount to his being “dead.” While the prodigal son in Luke 
feared his own literal death by starvation, if Jan has internal-
ized the equation of separateness with death, then Jan may feel 
psychically “dead” while separated from his family. Unlike the 
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prodigal son however, Jan cannot bring himself to announce 
that he has returned. He cannot make himself “alive again.”
Jan says he expected a welcome like the prodigal son’s, but 
his ruse assures that he will receive exactly what the prodigal 
son feared: an experience of indifference from the family and 
treatment as an outsider. 
Indeed, after Jan’s mother admits she “might have forgotten 
her daughter” had she left her side, she adds, “if a son came here, 
he’d find exactly what an ordinary guest can count on: amiable 
indifference, no more and no less” (Camus 1958, 96). 
Just as the prodigal son imagines that he may be forced to 
take on the identity of a servant to the family, rather than being 
a member of the family, Jan assumes a second identity when he 
pretends to be a mere lodger. Both a servant and a lodger can 
be expected to elicit, if not indifference, something far less than 
familial intimacy. As in the prodigal son’s offer to make himself 
a servant in penance for his sins, Jan seems to heap emotional 
punishment upon himself by pretending to be a mere stranger.
14.
According to Jan, his desire to return home is derived from the 
fact that, in his separation from the family, he and his family 
have been lost or dead to each other. He desires to revive his 
connection, however, with a family that offers only self-occlud-
ing family membership or nothing. While he pretends to seek 
recognition from and a mature relationship with his family, he 
must be at least partly aware that his family is incapable of rec-
ognizing and relating with him as a separate self. 
Thus, if he does seek to revive a relationship with his family, 
it can only be one based on immediate presence, family mem-
bership, and de-subjectified reunion. In this light, it is a mat-
ter of some importance that Maria offers him a more profound 
and more complete loving recognition of his self. “I’ve always 
loved everything about you, even what I didn’t understand, and 
I know that really I wouldn’t wish you to be other than who you 
are” (85). Tragically, Jan forsakes this apparently mature, loving 
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relationship to re-enact a drama of silence, loss, and death with 
his family.
To summarize: 
Jan’s odd yet carefully crafted deception permits him to re-
experience something of his original rage and grief while inflict-
ing pain and humiliation upon his family. 
At the same time, he protects himself from the possibility of 
further trauma and protects his family from his resentment and 
anger. 
He pursues his deception in a way that leaves his family a 
way out, an absolution from responsibility for this instance of 
misrecognition, since it is, after all, his deception and not their 
hateful indifference that misleads them this time. 
His ruse, therefore, partly protects his mother and sister, 
which expresses an underlying identification with his family, 
with those who abandoned him, rather than with his self, which 
felt and which continues to feel abandoned. 
Indeed, it is fair to say that Jan, rather than being able to 
make himself “alive again” before his family, has made himself 
a stranger to them, which suggests that his action may also ex-
press his desire to take responsibility for the loss associated with 
separation.
Jan’s deception allows him to hold on to his conscious esti-
mations of his feelings and intentions — that he is happy, that he 
does not “need” his family, and that he wishes to make his family 
happy — along with his unrealistic hope for a loving reception 
by his family. 
It permits him to safely recall an otherwise dangerous and 
anxiety-provoking rage and grief while “muddling” those feel-
ings with the pretenses of his ruse. 
It permits him to internalize responsibility for his family’s re-
jection of him while protecting his family from the punchline of 
his joke, as it were. 
Perhaps most importantly, it succeeds in replaying the very 
experience that he both dreads and needs, the experience that 
set him apart from his family for twenty years, the experience of 
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standing before his family as a separate person and being unrec-
ognized, unseen, unknown. 
By repeating this traumatic experience, Jan finds a way to 
identify with his family and their extreme demand that one ei-
ther belong or die, that one be in or out. 
Jan, therefore, seems to seek, and to find, not loving recogni-
tion for himself, but only a “morbid” repetition of a traumatic 







Persons go missing all the time. 
A thousand abdications for every abduction.
I am not making light of — 
2.
In “Obóz głodowy pod Jasłem” [“Jaslo Hunger Camp”],
Wisława Szymborska writes:
“History rounds off skeletons to zero.
A thousand and one is still only a thousand. 
That one seems never to have existed” (1997, 42).
3.
But by the time we’re counting skeletons —
To be accounted among the dead is not — 
To be the thousand and first skeleton —
To lament a missing one among a missing multitude —




Whether a person has existed —
Whether a person has been — 
It is not a question for history.   
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A Dream of Not Recovering from a Drug
 
I’ve unwittingly swallowed an extraordinarily potent and unfa-
miliar hallucinogenic drug.
Once ingested, I am told this drug will never leave my body. 
I will never be rid of it. It will never be rid of me. 
I could, theoretically, seek help, but the drug makes this impos-
sible. 
I keep forgetting what is real. 
I keep forgetting whether I am having fun or in a panic state. 
I am alone but amidst others. 
I can speak and laugh with them, but I cannot communi-
cate or expel — which, at times, feel as if they were the same 
thing — what is inside me. 
I am unable to carry out the simplest of plans, such as walking 
across a room, without suddenly realizing that I am already fall-
ing through a yawning, elastic hole in the middle of the floor. 
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I will never recover. 
I will remain in a state of incomprehensible madness for the rest 
of my life. 
I may die. 
Even if I live, I will not recognize myself. 
Before I wake, I recall that in spite of my horror, this dream, like 
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“W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of thinker-friends, 
thinker-lovers. He dreams of a thought-army, a thought-pack, 
which would storm the philosophical Houses of Parliament. He 
dreams of Tartars from the philosophical steppes, of thought-
barbarians, thought-outsiders. What distance would shine in 
their eyes!”
— Lars Iyer





